University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2010

The Authority for Federalism: Madison's Negative and the Origins
of Federal Ideology
Alison LaCroix

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alison LaCroix, "The Authority for Federalism: Madison's Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology," 28
Law and History Review 451 (2010).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

The Authority for Federalism: Madison's
Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology

ALISON L. LACROIX

The Philadelphia convention of 1787 looms enormous in many accounts of
U.S. constitutional history, serving as the set piece in which various and
muddled worldviews, theories, interests, and allegiances gelled into a
coherent science and structure of politics. The Convention thus becomes
time zero in the chronology of U.S. political and constitutional development, a finite and forward-looking first moment defining, for good or ill,
the terms according which subsequent debates regarding the nature of
U S. government would be conducted.
The moment of origin, in other words, sometimes appears to lack origins
of its own. Pre-Convention precedents provide antiquarian interest, perhaps, but are seen as offering little useful insight into the "real" legal questions concerning the post-1787 meaning and function of particular
constitutional doctrines. Legal scholars sometimes trawl the Convention
records for footnote fodder but ignore the context surrounding the remarks
they value. Many nonlawyer historians, meanwhile, avoid writing about
the Convention altogether, regarding it as a spoiled field overtrampled
by the lawyers or else as a moment about which little of interest remains
to be said. The strange place that the Philadelphia convention occupies
in U.S. constitutional history leads to several unfortunate consequences.
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Chief among them is a surprising shortage of scholarly attention to the
Convention as something other than an unassimilable outlier in historical
time, a sui generis moment of genius that set the terms of debate but
that resists efforts to place it in a broader temporal context extending
before, as well as after, 1787.
Federalism, according to such accounts, emerged as a by-product of this
foundational conversation among the men sitting in the Pennsylvania State
House during the summer of 1787. Along with judicial review, federalism
is frequently regarded as one of the signal American contributions to the
science of politics, its origin traceable to the drafting and ratification of
the Constitution, despite the lack of any explicit reference to either concept
in the document itself. I On this view, a set of ideas about government that
would later be called "federalism" began to coalesce at the Convention,
conjured into action by the exigencies of a fraying confederation and the
combined force of fifty-five creative minds. Federalism appears as a newmodeled creation cobbled together out of a mix of necessity (the existence
of the states) and theory (the belief that republics could not be easily maintained across a large territory). The product of these imperatives was not
simply a constitutional doctrine but rather an entire philosophy of government. In addition to providing the theory of authority that undergirded the
whole structure of the new republic, federalism took concrete form in the
particular provisions of the document that established that republic, from
the enumeration of Congress's powers in Article I, Section 8, to the supremacy clause of Article VI.
The story I have just described is the story of a beginning, with the
Convention debates serving as the first act in the unfolding drama of U S.
constitutional history, and therefore as the original moment for purposes of
understanding U.S. federalism. This is a familiar story, especially for constitutional scholars. To be sure, any study of the Constitution must devote
special attention to the moment of the document's creation. But there is
another account of the history of U.S. federalism that focuses not on the
period between 1787 and 1789 but on a broader, more diffuse time frame.
The few scholars who have explicitly discussed the question of federalism's origins have pointed to the structures and institutions of the British
Empire as the source of the concept of divided authority. 2 Most prominent
1. See, for example, US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring): "Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities,
one state and one federal, each protected by incursion from the other."
2. See, for example, Jack P. Greene, Peripheriesand Center: ConstitutionalDevelopment
in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1986); Andrew C. McLaughlin, A ConstitutionalHistory of
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among these scholars is Jack P. Greene, who argues that life under the
imperial system introduced American colonists to the notion that political
authority could be apportioned between a ruling metropolitan center and a
remote but expansive periphery. 3 In Greene's view, because colonists were
subject to multiple ascending layers of political authority (i.e., colonial legislature, royal governor, Parliament, Privy Council), only a minor conceptual adjustment was needed following independence to establish the
Constitution's two-level federal structure of state and national authority.
Greene, like constitutional historian Andrew C. McLaughlin before him,
argued that continuity characterized the transition from the Britain's "com4
posite empire" to the United States' federal republic.
Greene's story is one of institutions, of the day-to-day political experience of British North Americans, whose ideas about government
followed from their interactions with what Greene terms the "negotiated
authorities" that operated as a practical matter within the British
Empire. 5 Similarly, McLaughlin, writing in 1918, based his argument
for imperial-to-federal continuity on what he described as Americans'
"institutionaliz[ation] and legaliz[ation]" in the 1770s and 1780s of "the
practices of the prerevolutionary imperial system of Britain. ' 6 Such
accounts focus on the outward manifestations of authority rather than on
political beliefs or theories of government. In this sense, they embrace a
positivistic vision of political history, treating institutions and experience
as more reliable--or, at a minimum, more significant than-arguments
7
or ideology.
Recent books by Daniel Hulsebosch and Mary Sarah Bilder have
brought a similarly institutional focus to the question of the nature of
the eighteenth-century Anglo-American constitution. Hulsebosch's
ConstitutingEmpire focuses on "the way people experienced constitutions
rather than on constitutional theory," while Bilder's study of what she usefully terms "transatlantic legal culture" is "less interested in constructing a

the United States (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1935); Andrew C. McLaughlin,
"The Background of American Federalism," American Political Science Review

12

(1918): 215-40.
3. Greene, Peripheries and Center, 3.

4. For "composite empire" language, see McLaughlin, "Background of American
Federalism," 216.
5. Jack P. Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional

History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994).
6. McLaughlin, "Background of American Federalism," 216.
7. I am grateful to David Armitage for suggesting the experience-arguments distinction.
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conceptual demarcation of the legal structure of the empire" than in offering "a practical analysis about how the legal empire worked and, more
importantly, how litigants worked within it."' 8 Like McLaughlin and
Greene, Hulsebosch and Bilder for the most part bracket questions of ideology and theory, emphasizing the legal and constitutional experience of
eighteenth-century British North Americans rather than the processes of
argumentation and ideology formation that underpinned that experience.
In so doing, these most recent accounts of Anglo-American constitutional
history diverge from the ideologically oriented accounts by Bernard Bailyn
and Gordon S. Wood that have dominated the historiography of the
Founding period since the 1960s. 9 Describing late eighteenth-century

America as undergoing a "transformation of thought" that culminated by
1787 in "an entirely new conception of politics" based on republican theory, Bailyn and Wood each place ideas at the center of the analysis.' 0 The
new institutional history of early American constitutionalism, in contrast,
.emphasizes the outward, observable emanation of ideas, in the form of
experience.
The institutional approach thus offers both a methodological and a substantive contrast with the view of many constitutional law scholars and
with the republican theorists. In addition to the distinction between ideological and institutional emphases, the approaches privilege different
chronologies. The constitutional law story typically begins in 1787 and
pays little regard to colonial precedents, while both the institutional and
republican stories start more than a century and a half earlier, with the governments created by the first New World charters. The institutional and
republican views thus treat the Convention as an endpoint, or perhaps a
midpoint, in the process of Anglo-American legal development, while
the constitutional law approach venerates the Convention as the crucial

point of origin.

8. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of
Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2005), 7; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial

Legal Culture and the Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2004), 4, 7.
9. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-

1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).
10. Quotes from, respectively, Bailyn, Ideological Origins, xiv (1992 ed.); Wood,
Creation, viii (1972 ed.). Bailyn was himself responding to the work of Charles Beard,
which had emphasized the role of economic, social, and other material factors in bringing
about first the Revolution and then the Constitutional Convention; see Charles A. Beard,
An Economic Interpretation of the -Constitution of the United States (New York:

Macmillan, 1913).
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Substantively, the three approaches reach sharply different conclusions
on the question of federalism's origins. In keeping with its emphasis on
drafting and ratification as foundational moments, the constitutional law
version of events holds that American federalism was novel, and that the
creation of the Republic constituted a fundamental break with the past.
Republican scholars have offered a similar view, albeit with less focus
on federalism itself than on broader moments of ideological transformation
in late eighteenth-century American politics. The institutional view, meanwhile, implicitly downplays the significance of the Convention, suggesting
that 1787 was one of many moments of negotiation and reshuffling among
preexisting institutional forms.
Here I seek to enrich the existing array of accounts by offering a different view, from both a methodological and a substantive standpoint, of the
origins of U.S. federalism. Methodologically, I seek to bring ideology back
into the discussion of the meaning and significance of federalism in the
Founding and ratification periods, and to place the Philadelphia convention
in the broader context of federal thought in the late eighteenth century.
Institutions are, to be sure, an important part of the story, but the ideas surrounding those institutions-the words and concepts that contemporary
actors used as they explained to themselves what the institutions meantthemselves played a constitutive role in defining the contours first of
colonial and then of early national government."I
This ideological interpretation of federalism complements recent, divergent accounts of the Founding era by Max Edling and David Hendrickson.
Whereas Edling views federalists in the early Republic as focused entirely
on "the need to build a powerful state and to explain how this state would
work," Hendrickson warns against "exaggerat[ing] the significance of the
national idea in the era of revolution and constitution-building" and instead
emphasizes the role of the Confederation and Constitution as "peace pacts"
among "sovereign and independent communities."' 12 An ideological
approach offers one possible way to reconcile these seemingly conflicting
accounts. If the organizing principle of federal ideology was divided authority, that principle might well have meant divided authority for some
contemporaries (whom, following Edling, we might now identify as
11. On the relationship between language and institutions in intellectual and political history, see Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in Meaning
and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1988).
12. Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the US.
Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003), 219; David C. Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American
Founding (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), ix.
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nationalists) and divided authority for others (whom, following
Hendrickson, we might now call confederalists).
As for the substantive question of the nature of relationship between federalism circa 1789 and what came before, ideas are again central to my
account. I argue that although the history of federalism did not begii
with the Constitutional Convention, the debates at Philadelphia represented
a vital moment in which British imperial precedents, colonial practices,
postwar exigency, and political theory came together in the hands of particular individuals to form both a new idea of government and an actual
new government. Certainly, some of federalism's central ideas had
begun to emerge in the 1760s and 1770s, cobbled together by members
of the colonial opposition in the midst of protracted disputes between
British North Americans and their metropolitan counterparts. But the
debates, and the constitution that resulted, created and codified federalism
in important ways. Arguments about the nature and scope of Parliament's
power to regulate the colonies, which began as the colonists' response to
what they viewed as unconstitutional legislation from Westminster, became
by the 1780s a full-blown theory of government authority. With the rebellion against Britain behind them, the members of the Founding generation
found themselves able-indeed, required-to consolidate the previous two
decades' many shreds and pieces of structural and political argument into a
more or less coherent conception of government. In this sense, then, the
debates at Philadelphia represented neither an original moment of genius
nor simply another instance of negotiation among existing groups and
institutions. -Rather, the period from 1787 to 1789 should be understood
as a reexamination and reshuffling of fundamental ideas of government
with which Americans had begun experimenting decades before. The drafting and ratification of the Constitution served to crystallize a novel, distinctively British North American theory of govemment that had been
developing since at least the mid-i 760s.
The story of federalism's development in the 1780s is thus primarily one
of ideology formation. U.S. federalism's central ideas-multilayered authority, a substantive (as opposed to territorial or personal) approach to jurisdiction, a central government with a brief and identity distinct from the
combined wills of the component states-had begun to coalesce in the
1760s and 1770s, when colonial commentators deployed them against
metropolitan claims of parliamentary supremacy. Under the British
Empire, the belief that a single government might legitimately contain multiple layers of authority underlay colonists' claims that their own assemblies ought to operate parallel to rather than subject to Parliament. In a
1764 pamphlet, for example, Virginian Richard Bland acknowledged
Westminster's authority over the colonies in matters of external
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governance but then insisted that "the legislature of the colony have a right
to enact ANY law they shall think necessary for their INTERNAL government." 13 This premise of legislative multiplicity became the basis of a new
ideology, in David Armitage's sense of the word: "a systematic model of
how society functions" and also "a world-view which is perceived as contestable by those who do not share it."'1 4 This protofederal ideology of multilayered government required a great deal of explanation throughout the
Revolutionary period, as colonial commentators sought to explain why
their scheme of what Robert Cover would later term "jurisdictional redundancy" did not violate contemporary political theory's proscription of
15
imperium in imperio, or a government within a govemment.
Multilayered authority thus became a plausible way to arrange govemment in the course of the Revolutionary-era debates. Yet the specter of
imperium in imperio continued to haunt political discourse. One need
only consider the Articles of Confederation to appreciate the uncertainty
with which members of the Founding generation faced the problem of giving structure to their vision of multiplicity. True, the Articles contemplated
two levels of government: the several states and the United States of
America. Yet the actual operations of the United States of America were
to be carried out by an entity denominated "the United States, in
Congress assembled" and limited to a handful of "expressly delegated"
powers in specific subject areas, including war, treaties, currency, post
offices, and Indian affairs. 16 As John Adams's reference to the
Massachusetts congressional delegation as "our embassy" suggests, the
general government was less a distinct level of government than a shell
organization that occasionally served as the venue for meetings of the constituent entities. 17 The United States existed only at the moments when its
members were in Congress assembled; it claimed no executive or judiciary.
The general government, in other words, was essentially an emanation
from the states.
13. Common Sense [Richard Bland], The Colonel Dismounted: or the Rector Vindicated.
In a Letter addressedto His Reverence: Containinga Dissertationupon the Constitution of
the Colony (Williamsburg, Va.: Joseph Royle, 1764), 22-23.
14. David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5.
15. Robert M. Cover, "The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation," William andMary Law Review 22 (1981): 639-82. On the concept of imperium
in imperio, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, "Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of
Empire in New York, 1750-1777," Law and History Review 16 (1998): 319-79.
16. Articles of Confederation, art. 2; art. 9 (1777).
17. Ibid., art. 2; Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation:An Interpretation of the
Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), 164 (quoting Adams).
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In the summer of 1787, then, when the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention gathered, federalism's central idea-the possibility that a functional government could comprise more than one sovereign-remained
largely untested. Despite the vast changes that Americans' conception
of political authority had undergone since the 1760s, the Articles of
Confederation represented a crude attempt to institutionalize the idea of
multiplicity in the same forms that had hamstrung British Americans in
their debates with metropolitan commentators. From the Stamp Act controversy to the many angry colloquies between royal governors and colonial
assemblies to the Articles themselves, colonists had devoted their arguments to proving that multilayered authority, in the form of multiple legislatures, offered a viable method of governing a far-flung empire.
But simply stacking legislatures did not answer several crucial questions,
including profound questions of institutional multiplicity's theoretical
and practical significance. If the central intellectual issue of the
Revolutionary-era debates was hammering out a conception of multilayered government, the central achievement of the Philadelphia convention was assembling an institutional structure to support that conception.
And, in the course of these efforts, participants in the drafting and ratification debates offered not only a plausible form of multilayered authority but
also a novel normative vision of composite government distinct from past
Anglo-American practice and theory. The legislature-centered approaches
to multiplicity that had characterized the 1760s and 1770s gave way in
the early Republic to a reexamination of foundational questions of the
location of authority within a composite polity, and to practical issues of
how such a polity might actually operate. The floor of the Convention
became a crucial site for this reexamination.
In particular, the debate surrounding James Madison's proposal to give
Congress the power to negative state laws required delegates to work
through the meaning of multiplicity. In the end, the delegates' rejection
of the negative and adoption instead of a judicialized approach to the problem of multilayered authority signaled a fundamental shift from the colonial approach to such issues, and even from the Articles of Confederation.
By 1787, the previous decades' embrace of multiplicity as the response to
full-throated metropolitan insistence on unitary authority seemed insufficient to the pressing problems of establishing a government. Colonial commentators' refrain of multiplicity gave few specifics as to what that idea
might mean in practice, or what forms it would take in a postimperial
state. The Revolutionary ideology of multiplicity, in other words, seemed
by 1787 to demand a new institutional structure. With a mandate to assemble that new structure, the Convention delegates rejected the established
legislative solution embodied in Madison's negative and turned instead
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to another institution-the judiciary-to mediate between state and general
governments. In so doing, they gave their institutional choice of a judicial
approach a normative edge. The Revolutionary belief in multiplicity thus
melded with a new structural commitment to a judicial solution. The result
was both ideology and institution, and it was called federalism.
Participants in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution thus
worked Revolutionary ideology into a new institutional structure, a process
that in turn helped create a new ideology. This story, therefore, has to do
with institutions, but it is not an institutional story in that it focuses on the
ideas and debates that went into setting up the institutions. The debate over
Madison's negative was a debate about federal thinking. The central story
line of that debate was the emergence of not just an idea, but an ideology,
of multitiered authority.

Curing the Vices of Confederacies
A critical moment for the notion of authority, particularly the species of
layered authority that would characterize American federalism, came in
1786, as the American Confederation struggled to solidify its victory
over its former imperial master in the face of political unrest, fiscal ruin,
and sectional rivalry. Between April and June of that year, during the
recess of the Virginia House of Delegates in which he served, James
Madison returned to his home in Orange County, Virginia, where he
immersed himself in his extensive library of historical treatises. Two trunkfils of books had recently arrived from Madison's friend Thomas
Jefferson, who had been detailed to Paris in 1784 to replace Benjamin
Franklin as American minister to the Court of Versailles, and to whom
Madison had given free rein to acquire and relay as many books as possible
concerning the fates of confederacies both antique and contemporary.' 8
The thirty-five-year-old Madison, already famously hard-working, settled
back into his parents' Piedmont home, Montpelier, and addressed himself
to the task of canvassing this precious "literary cargo." 19 His research
18. Editorial Note, The Papersof James Madison, ed. Robert A. Rutland etal. (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1975), 9:3-4 (hereafter PJM).
19. Madison to Jefferson, March 18, 1786, PJM, 8:501. Madison's devotion to his studies
had always been remarkable: Upon completion of his bachelor's degree at Princeton in two
years, Madison was forced to remain in New Jersey an additional year in order to regain his
strength while continuing with private studies. Despite taking this care, however, when
Madison returned to Montpelier in April 1772, he suffered something like a nervous breakdown. At least one historian posits that the matriculation decision a few years later of another
founder, Alexander Hamilton, may have been dictated by Princeton president John
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yielded forty-one pocket-sized pages of handwritten notes that surveyed
political entities from the Amphyctionic 2Confederacy
of classical Greece
0
to the contemporary United Netherlands.
Despite some initial misgivings about the prospect of tinkering with the
Republic's foundational document, Madison spent his days and nights
(aside from the occasional evening game of whist) searching for answers
in the experiences of other confederacies. Madison did find guidance,
but in the form of cautionary tales rather than specific models of government.2 ' In his notes he judged the ancient and modem confederacies
harshly, enumerating their shortcomings under the heading "Vices of the
Constitution." The chief failing of these storied political systems? In
each case, the newly constituted "fcederal authority" remained beholden
to the component states, secondary-in both the power it wielded and
the allegiance it demanded-to the entities that had created it. In their
efforts to preserve the sovereignty of the members, the creators of these
confederacies had rendered the central government impotent. The famed
Achaean League of ancient Greece, for example, had failed, Madison
believed, because the "defect [i.e., lack] of subjection in the members to
the general authority ruined the whole Body."'22 Similarly, Madison
noted with respect to the contemporary Holy Roman Empire, "Jealousy
of the Imperial authority seems to have been a great cement of the confederacy. ' '23 The repetition of the word "authority" here is striking.
Overarching both statements is Madison's conclusion that the confederacies in question were dysfunctional because their structure failed to settle
the fundamental question of authority, of which entity possessed ultimate
power-the component polities or the general government.
Moreover, the way Madison. used the term "authority" also reveals a
more specific conclusion. Throughout the "Notes," the term "authority"
is nearly always allied with one of three other terms: "foederal," "general,"
or "imperial." In the course of examining existing structures of authority,
Madison also addressed the unasked question that had likely motivated
his task in the first place: What was the nature of authority in a republic
comprising multiple preexisting entities that had long considered
Witherspoon's desire to avoid a repeat of Madison's experience, which led Witherspoon to
deny Hamilton's request to proceed through the curriculum at his own (rapid) pace, and he
consequently sent Hamilton north to King's College in New York; see Ron Chemow,
Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin, 2004), 48; see also Ralph Ketcham, James
Madison: A Biography (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1990), 51-52.
20. Ketcham, James Madison, 184.
21. Ibid.
22. "Notes on Ancient and Modem Confederacies," PJM, 9:8, 22.
23. Ibid., 22.
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themselves to be independent, sovereign states? If that republic was to suc-

ceed where its predecessors had failed, the answer was clear to Madison:
Authority must be tied to that which was federal, general, or imperialthat is, in the case of the United States, to a national government.
Recognition of this problem led Madison to conclude that the Articles of
Confederation, premised on a vague hierarchy of legislatures, were insufficient to the task of bringing the states together under a strong central government. 24 "Our situation is becoming every day more & more critical,"
Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph in February 1787, as he sat in an
increasingly idle Confederation Congress awaiting the approaching
Philadelphia convention. "No money comes into the federal Treasury.
No respect is paid to the federal authority; and people of reflection unan-

imously agree that the existing Confederacy is tottering to its foundation. '25 The question for Madison-and for the Constitutional
Convention-became how to save the United States from the fate that,
he believed, had reduced other confederacies to little more than impotent
leagues, the power of which was limited to serving the will and convenience of their component states. Madison would deploy his analysis
throughout the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788, and in his contributions to The Federalistduring
the winter and spring of 1787-88.26
By the time the delegates to the Constitutional Convention began trick-

ling into Philadelphia in May 1787, Madison had arrived at a solution that
he believed would establish the supremacy of the general government. 27 In
24. Jack Rakove describes Madison's revelation thus: "Madison now understood that any
federal system based on the voluntary compliance of the states was likely to fail, for three
reasons that could be formulated almost as theoretical postulates. First, because states had
different interests, it was unlikely that they would have an equal stake in carrying out
every federal policy. Second, in every state there would be politicians-'courtiers of popularity,' Madison called them-who would always hope to advance their own interests by criticizing national measures. Third, and most important, even where the states did share
common interests, mutual doubts as to whether other states would comply with national
decisions would encourage shirking" (Jack N. Rakove, James Madison and the Creation
of the American Republic, 2nd ed. [New York: Longman, 2002], 52-53).
25. Madison to Randolph, February 25, 1787, PJM, 9:299.
26. Federalist 18 focused on the ancient confederacies, especially the Amphyctionic and
Achaean leagues; Federalist 19 discussed contemporary confederacies, including the Holy
Roman Empire, Poland, and the Swiss confederacy; and Federalist20 considered the contemporary United Netherlands (The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke [Middletown, Conn.:
Wesleyan University Press, 1961]).
27. Madison had arrived in Philadelphia on May 5, in time for the Convention's first
scheduled meeting on May 14, but the lack of a quorum postponed the initial session
until May 25. Madison reported these events to Jefferson on May 15, noting, "The number
as yet assembled is small... . There is a prospect of a pretty full meeting on the whole,
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a coded letter to Jefferson, he laid out his prescription: "Over & above the
positive power of regulating trade and sundry other matters in which uniformity is proper, to arm the federal head with a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local Legislatures. '28 "Without this defensive power

experience and reflection have satisfied me that however ample the federal
powers may be made, or however Clearly their boundaries may be delineated, on paper, they will be easily and continually baffled by the

Legislative sovereignties of the States." Madison's remedy for the vices
of the American Confederation appeared simple enough: to vest the general
(federal) government with the power to veto laws passed by the state
legislatures.
This "federal negative" proved to be the linchpin of Madison's plan for
reforming the national charter.2 9 In a trio of letters to Jefferson, Randolph,
and Washington written in March and April 1787, which Douglass Adair
has called the seedbeds of "the first shoot in his thoughts of a plan of
Federal Government," Madison elaborated on his vision. 30 Taking a cue
from his earlier observations concerning the jealousies of the states,
Madison now presented the federal negative as the cure to both the pro-

blem of authority that had dogged every other confederation and to what
he viewed as the related problem of the states' increasing tendency to
carry rule by majority to dangerous excess. 3 1 The effect of incorporating
though there is less punctuality than was to be wished. Of this the late bad weather has been
the principal cause" (Madison to Jefferson, May 15, 1787, PJM, 9:415).
28. Madison to Jefferson, March 19, 1787, PJM, 9:3 f8. As Larry Kramer points out, the
phrase "in all cases whatsoever" echoed the language of the hated Declaratory Act of 1766
(Larry D. Kramer, "Madison's Audience," HarvardLaw Review 112 [1999]: 628). Kramer
notes that "Madison could not have picked language more likely to arouse anxieties about
centralized authority."
29. Scholars have employed a variety of terms to refer to Madison's proposed negative,
including "the negative on state laws," "the federal veto," and "the federal negative." In
his intellectual biography of Madison, Lance Banning uses the latter two phrases; see
Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty, 117, 188. This article will use the term "federal
negative."
30. Douglass Adair, "James Madison's Autobiography," William andMary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., 2 (1945): 202.
31. Many scholars who have studied Madison's federal negative have emphasized its role
as a weapon against majoritarian tyranny, and have therefore viewed it.as inextricably linked
with Madison's discussion in Federalist 10 of the problem of faction and the consequent
need for a large republic; see, for example,- Kramer, "Madison's Audience"; Rakove,
OriginalMeanings, 51, 197. These and other scholars have viewed it as evidence of a creeping nationalist, even consolidationist, tendency in Madison's thought; see, for example,
Charles F. Hobson, "The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and
the Crisis of Republican Government," in The Federal Constitution, ed. Peter S. Onuf
(New York: Garland, 1991), 258; Forrest McDonald, States' Rights and the Union:
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the federal negative into the amended charter, he wrote, would be "not only

to guard the national rights and interests against invasion, but also to
restrain the States from thwarting and molesting each other, and even
from oppressing the minority within themselves by paper money and

'32
other unrighteous measures which favor the interest of the majority.
The federal negative, therefore, would remedy several of the twelve
"Vices of the Political System of the United States" that Madison enumerated in his essay of the same name, written in April 1787 as he prepared for
the Philadelphia convention: "Failure of the States to comply with the
Constitutional requisitions"; "Encroachments by the States on the federal
authority"; and "Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other"; and
four other provisions concerning the "Multiplicity," "[M]utability,"
"Injustice," and "Impotence" of state laws under the Confederation. 33
The concept of granting a central legislative authority the power to veto
the acts of a subordinate legislature was not Madison's innovation, as he
readily acknowledged. Indeed, his own words laid bare the source of
Madison's solution to the problem of authority: the British Empire. 34
Regarding the national government, Madison wrote to Randolph on
April 8, "Let it have a negative in all cases whatsoever on the
Legislative Acts of the States as the K. of G. B. heretofore had." In a
more formal, less shorthand-laden letter to Washington eight days later,
Madison elaborated. A "negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative
acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative,"
Madison wrote, was "absolutely necessary" and constituted "the least

Imperium in Imperio (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 18; Rakove, Original
Meanings, 51. Banning disagrees profoundly with the latter position, saying that one of
his own purposes is "to utterly deny-in the face of very old and very influential emphases
on the reactionary character of constitutional reform-that there was any hint of such a counterrevolutionary attitude in Madison himself." Banning also notes that Hobson later retreated
somewhat from his stance; see Banning, SacredFire of Liberty, 127, 442n22. Although this
debate is obviously significant, I will focus on the negative in the context of the transition
from imperial to federal modes of authority.
32. Madison to Jefferson, March 19, 1787, PJM, 9:318.
33. "Vices of the Political System of the United States," April 1787, in PJM, 9:348-57.
34. Several historians have discussed the influence of imperial practice on Madison's
thinking about the federal negative. Most notable are Banning, Sacred Fire of Liberty,
118; Bilder, Transatlantic Constitution, 191-92; Andrew C. McLaughlin, The
Foundations of American Constitutionalism (New York: New York University Press,
1932), 153; Michael P. Zuckert, "A System without Precedent: Federalism in the
American Constitution," in The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution, ed. Leonard
W. Levy and Dennis J. Mahoney (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 144-45; Jack N.
Rakove, "Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I," Green Bag 2nd ser., 2 (1998): 40-41.
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possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions." 35 The centerpiece of
Madison's plan to reconstitute the Republic, therefore, sprang directly
fiom the institutions and practices of the British Empire, the thralldom
of which the American colonies had escaped only four years before.
The inspiration to import the negative to American shores seems to have
been brewing in Madison's mind as early as spring 1786, when he
composed his "Notes on Ancient and Modem Confederacies." The causal
cascade between the other confederacies' lack of a mechanism by which
the central government could police the laws of the component entities,
the perceived failings of those confederacies, and the presence of such a
mechanism in the British Empire echoed throughout his writings in
1786-87. In order to save the Union, Madison proposed grafting onto
the founding charter a provision requiring the same type of ex ante review
of state legislative acts that the British monarch, through the mechanism of
the Privy Council, had formerly wielded over the acts of the colonial
assemblies.

Imperial Modes of Review
The Privy Council was a hybrid executive and legislative body comprising
the king and his councillors, many of whom were peers and therefore also
members of the House of Lords. 36 Since the early twentieth century, a few
legal historians have focused on the Privy Council's appellate review of
colonial legislative acts and judicial decisions. Beginning with a brace of
articles published by Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. in 1913, scholars have
argued that the structure of review established by the Privy Council
influenced American colonists' understanding of the hierarchical array of
legal authorities in which they lived. 37 As the legal historian Joseph
35. Madison to Randolph, April 8, 1787, PJM, 9:370; Madison to Washington, April 16,
1787, PJM, 9:383.
36. Blackstone defined the Privy Council as "the principal council belonging to the king"
and describes its composition as follows: "The king's will is the sole constituent of a privy
counsellor; and this also regulates their number"; see William Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England (1765-69; reprint, with an introduction by Stanley N. Katz, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 1:222-23; see also Black's Law Dictionary,6th ed., s.v.
"Privy Council": "In England, the principal council of the sovereign, composed of the cabinet ministers, and other persons chosen by the king or queen as privy councillors."
37. Arthur Meier Schlesinger, "Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council," [parts 1 and 2],
PoliticalScience Quarterly 28 (2) (1913):279-97, and 28 (3) (1913): 433-50. My discussion
of the hierarchical underpinnings of colonial and early American appellate review is
informed by Philip Hamburger's discussion of the "hierarchical assumptions" that undergirded seventeenth- and eighteenth-century understandings of superior and inferior law;
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Henry Smith demonstrated, medieval theories of kingship--still widely
espoused in the late seventeenth century in the form of the legal fiction
that the colonies qualified as "king's dominions" by right of conquest-dictated that the colonies did not fall within the ambit of domestic
English appellate procedure. 38 Thus, instead of bringing his case before
the King's Bench, as his counterpart at home in Swindon or Bristol
might, a colonist who wished to appeal an adverse decision by his highest
colonial court could request a hearing before the Crown, in the form of the
Privy Council. 39 Such practices fell under the rubric of royal prerogative
and therefore tied the colonies directly to monarchical authority. 40 Mary
Sarah Bilder has recently elaborated on Smith's findings, arguing that
the Privy Council's standard of review, which interrogated colonial laws
to determine whether they were repugnant to the laws of England, connected the New World to the Old by creating a "transatlantic constitution"
41
based on specific levels of hierarchical authority.

see Philip Hamburger, "Law and Judicial Duty," George Washington Law Review 72 (2003):
9-12.
38. Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council From the American Plantations

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950; reprint, New York: Octagon, 1965).
39. Technically, the forum for such appeals was a specially designated committee of the
Privy Council. From 1675 to 1696, that committee was variously nominated the Committee
of Trade and Foreign Plantations and subsequently the Committee for Trade and Plantations;
the members of both entities were also known as the Lords Committee of Trade and
Plantations. Between 1675 and 1696, the committee fluctuated in size from as few as twelve
to as many as thirty-three members, occasionally comprising the entire membership of the
Privy Council. A 1696 act of William III reorganized the committee and renamed it the
Board of Trade and the Committee for Hearing Appeals from the Plantations; see Smith,
Appeals to the Privy Council, 71-72, 132-38; see also Julius Goebel Jr., Antecedents and
Beginnings to 1801, Vol. 1, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme

Court of the United States, ed. Paul A. Freund (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 60-65.
Smith notes that "all these committees were conciliar derivatives-their decisions gained
force only through Orders in Council issued by the Council Board itself"; see Smith,
Appeals to the Privy Council, 72. I therefore follow the usage of Smith and others and
employ the general phrase "Privy Council" to refer to the body responsible for hearing
appeals from the colonies and evaluating colonial acts for conformity to the laws of England.
40. Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 464-523. The doctrine of the king's dominions
was a holdover from the Middle Ages, when English kings held lands outside the realm,
such as Aquitaine or Normandy. By the time English colonization of the New World
began in 1607, however, these overseas holdings had dwindled to the Channel Islands,
which alone possessed the standing to claim a right of appeal to the Crown; see Goebel,
Antecedents and Beginnings, 36.
41. Bilder, TransatlanticConstitution, 1-4. Cf. Randolph G. Adams, PoliticalIdeas of the
American Revolution: Britannic-American Contributions to the Problem of Imperial

Organization, 1765 to 1775 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1958; 1919), 117-18 (discussing
eighteenth-century conceptions of the repugnancy principle).
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These histories have focused primarily on one species of the Privy
Council's activity-its review of colonial judicial decisions-as part of a
project of tracing continuities between imperial and colonial modes of
appellate jurisdiction, and ultimately the origins of American judicial
review. 42 Yet the Privy Council's power to scrutinize colonial law
extended beyond reviewing the decisions of colonial courts. In addition
to exercising this protojudicial review, the Privy Council wielded a
power over the colonies that modem legal scholars would now call legislative review: that is, the power to evaluate the acts of colonial legislatures,

unattached to a specific case or set of parties, and to declare those acts
either valid or invalid as applied prospectively to all persons and all scenarios. 4 3 Fewer scholars have focused on44the impact of this parallel practice
of legislative or administrative review.

Certainly, as many scholars have argued, the parsing of distinctions
between such modem notions as judicial and legislative review and applying them retrospectively to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal

proceedings is fraught with peril. Anglo-American jurists of the period
did not recognize a firm distinction between adjudication and legislation;
this was why, as Charles Mcllwain and others have ably demonstrated,
the medieval English Parliament could be characterized as both a high
court and as a legislative body.45 The ambiguity endured in the
42. See, for example, Bilder, TransatlanticConstitution, 6; Hamburger, "Law and Judicial
Duty."
43. In modem jurisprudence, of course, the only way to challenge a law's operation in all
situations and with respect to all parties is to mount a facial challenge: that is, a challenge to
the statute on its face, as opposed to an as-applied challenge, which takes on the statute only
as it is applied to a particular type of party or set of facts. In both cases, however, an
aggrieved party must bring the challenge; courts will not take up the issue of their own
volition, as such an act would violate the Constitution's case or controversy requirement;
see U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2. Because the application of facial challenges is so broad,
courts have erected substantial barriers to their successful prosecution, rendering them relatively rare. Examples are the Supreme Court's holding in National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998): "Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that
has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort" (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987): "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."
On this distinction generally, see Richard H. Fallon Jr., "As-Applied and Facial Challenges
and Third-Party Standing," HarvardLaw Review 113 (2000): 1321-70.
44. Goebel refers to such practices as "administrative control of colony legislation," but
Smith terms them "legislative review" (Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 60); see also
Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 523.
45. The ur-text on this subject is Charles H. Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament:An
Historical Essay on the Boundaries Between Legislation and Adjudication (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1910). More recent interpretations of this issue in the
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American colonies. 46 Consequently, to expect the legal forms of the period
to conform neatly to modem taxonomies is to court anachronism.
Yet it is possible to analyze the substance of the action at hand and to
categorize it as more like one or the other form of review, as jurists
today understand them. The hallmark of adjudication is specificity: particular parties bring a particular dispute before a decision-making body, which
body then issues a ruling that applies primarily to the particular case at
hand and, secondarily, as a precedent to aid in deciding future cases that
materially resemble the case. Judicial review is similarly specific: particular
parties bring before a decision-making body either the ruling of another,
inferior decision-making body or else a statute promulgated by a lawmaking body. Legislation and legislative review, by contrast, aspire toward
generality, if not universality. Unlike bodies responsible for adjudicating
disputes, legislative bodies issue rules that apply to all persons and scenarios covered by the terms of the legislation; moreover, the rules apply
47
only prospectively.
The Privy Council exercised both varieties of review with respect to the
American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, albeit to
varying degrees depending on each colony's particular legal organization.
By positing that lands beyond the realm were held by the monarch alone by
virtue of conquest, the doctrine of the king's dominions vested the king's
council with authority to oversee colonial legislation and to review the
decisions of colonial courts. The extent of the Privy Council's authority
over the legislative acts and judicial decisions of a given colony therefore
depended on the quantum of royal control that underpinned the colony's
founding. In the initial decades of North American colonization, the general taxonomy was as follows: royal colonies were clearly subject to the
maximum level of royal control, including both legislative and judicial

American context include Barbara A. Black, "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the
Colonists," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 124 (1976): 1157-1211.
46. For a discussion of the link between the development of bicameral legislatures in the
colonies and the judicial-legislative distinction, see Mark DeWolfe Howe and Louis F.
Eaton Jr., "The Supreme Judicial Power in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay," New
England Quarterly 20 (1947): 291-316.
47. At the risk of spoiling the ending of my story, I should here point out that the case or
controversy requirement ultimately found its way into the Constitution in order to prevent
just such practices as the Privy Council's ex ante legislative review from taking root in
the federal courts (U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2). The alternative to a case or controversy
standard is to permit courts to issue advisory opinions-that is, judicial statements as to
whether a law is valid without an aggrieved party's having first challenged the law. For
more on this distinction and the rationale behind it, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal
Jurisdiction, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen, 2003), 44-56.

468

Law and History Review, May 2010

review by the Privy Council; 48 charter colonies were subject to varying
levels of royal control depending on the specific provisions and reservations of their charters; 49 and proprietary colonies were subject to minimal amounts of royal control and thus typically lacked appeal to the
50
Privy Council, except as otherwise provided by local assemblies.
Following the 1675 and 1696 establishment of the Committee of Trade
and Plantations and the Board of Trade, respectively, the Crown sought
to tighten its control over the colonies by expanding the Privy Council's
jurisdiction to review colonial legislative acts and judicial decisions. 5 1
In cases of judicial review, an aggrieved colonial party first sought permission to appeal to the metropolitan authority, via either a grant of permission from the colonial court or, failing that, the grant of a petition
from the Privy Council itself. Upon receiving one or the other form of permission, which involved meeting certain procedural and jurisdictional
requirements, such as a minimum damage amount, the appellant presented
his or her case during a hearing before the Privy Council's Committee for
Appeals. The verdict, which required the monarch's imprimatur, came in
the form of an order in council. Between 1680 and 1780, the Privy
52
Council heard 265 such appeals from the thirteen American colonies.
In contrast to this highly judicialized role, when the Privy Council
engaged in its parallel mode of legislative review, it issued a sweeping
declaration either approving or disallowing a colonial legislative act. 53 In
48. See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 77-7.8 (discussing the early precedents of the
Channel Islands), 79-82 (discussing Virginia and New Hampshire). In both royal and proprietary colonies, the local assembly was subject to an additional level of imperial oversight
in the form of the governor's veto; see Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics
(New York: Knopf, 1968), 67.
49. See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 45-46 (discussing "the recalcitrance of
Massachusetts Bay" in repeatedly challenging the royal power to hear appeals from the colony during the first half of the seventeenth century), 51-54 (canvassing Connecticut, Rhode
Island, and the Carolinas).
50. Ibid., 85-86 (discussing New Jersey and Maryland).
51. See Anthony McFarlane, The British in the Americas, 1480-1815 (London: Longman,
1992), 198; see also Goebel, Appeals to the Privy Council, 40, 61-65.
52. Schlesinger, "Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, II," 437-38, 446. Schlesinger
notes that after 1734 or 1735, the Privy Council records drop the phrase "for Appeals"
and refer to the decision-making body simply as "the Committee" (ibid., 439).
53. The breadth of the Privy Council's reach prompted Charles M. Andrews to emphasize
the relationship between disallowance and the royal prerogative. Andrews described disallowance as "an executive rather than a legislative act" because it was "performed not by
the king but by the Council as his executive agent." The power of disallowance was thus
'an exercise of the royal prerogative, an expression of the king's supreme authority in the
enacting of laws by inferior law-making bodies, whose right to make laws at all rested on
the king's will." Andrews concluded, therefore, that disallowance was "not a veto but an
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some special cases, the Privy Council went even further by holding a colonial act void ab initio-not only invalidating the act prospectively but also
declaring that the act had never been valid in the first place. Julius Goebel
found only four examples of legislative declarations of nullity ab initio
during the colonial period, observing that the Privy Council seems to

have preferred to issue such rulings in specific cases that came before it
on appeal and that thus required it to act in its judicial capacity. 54 This preference likely arose out of prudential concerns, as well as what Goebel
terms "the indurated common law tradition that issues of such moment
should be settled in true adversarial proceedings.

'55

The realities of contemporary transportation meant that a declaration that
a law had never been valid would almost certainly give rise to further disputes about the status of contracts and obligations entered into during the
period between the passage of the act in the colonies and the arrival there

of news that it had been invalidated by the Privy Council. 56 In the majority
of cases in which the Privy Council invalidated a colonial act, it held that
the act had been valid during the interim period prior to the invalidation,
and that therefore rights could vest under the act. 57 Consequently, as

Goebel points out, disallowance by the Privy Council cannot accurately
be likened to a veto, insofar as disallowance would permit an interim
period of validity, because a veto would immediately negate the act,
act of regulation and control" (Charles M. Andrews, "The Royal Disallowance,"
Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society 24 [1914]: 343).
54. Here Goebel and Smith differ in their interpretations. While Goebel suggests that the
Privy Council in its judicial capacity declared void ab initio multiple, albeit very few, colonial acts, Smith states that there was only one such case: Winthrop v. Lechmere (P.C. 1728),
reprinted in Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut (Hartford, Conn.: Lockwood &
Brainard Co., 1873) 7:578, in which a 1699 Connecticut intestacy law was held void as contrary to English law and the colonial charter. The two scholars agree, however, that the
mechanism of voiding a colonial statute ab initio was used when the Privy Council was acting both in its legislative and its judicial capacities; see Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings,
72-73; but also see Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 537.
55. Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 72.
56. Goebel distinguishes thus between declarations of nullity ab initio and disallowance:
"A declaration of nullity was something close to catastrophic, for everything that might have
been done under [the act] was rendered nugatory" (ibid., 69).
57. Goebel does note, however, that some colonial acts included a suspending clause
explicitly stating that the act was not final, and therefore that no rights and duties could
be created pursuant to it, until it was affirmatively validated by the Privy Council. The
Crown pressed for such clauses as a means of emphasizing the incompleteness of colonial
legislative authority. Goebel states, however, that many-perhaps the majority---of colonial
acts went into effect with no ruling one way or the other by metropolitan authorities. Thus,
he concludes that "whatever the theory, the Crown was practically not an indispensable
party" (ibid., 68).
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permitting no such period. 58 According to one estimate, the Privy Council
59
disallowed 5.5 percent of the colonial statutes that it reviewed.

The most vigorous contests between Crown and colonies concerning the
Privy Council's authority originated in the chartered colonies after 1696.
The administrative reorganization that resulted in the establishment of
the Board of Trade heralded a renewed metropolitan effort to bring the

chartered colonies to heel by drawing them into the ambit of the
Crown's appellate power. 60 Although some early grants explicitly reserved

to the Crown the authority to hear judicial appeals (beginning with a 1664
patent to the Duke of York),6 1 after 1696 royal officials routinely argued
that such authority inhered in the very nature of the colonies as portions
62
of the king's dominions.
58. In other words, rights could vest pursuant to an act even if that act was subsequently
disallowed, but no rights could vest pursuant to an act that was vetoed and thus never took
effect (ibid., 68-72).
59. Elmer Beecher Russell, The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in
Council (New York: Columbia University Press, 1915), 221. Forrest McDonald gives a similar number, reporting that the Board of Trade disallowed 469 of the 8,563 mainland colonial
acts that it reviewed, or 5.47 percent (McDonald, States' Rights and the Union, 2).
60. See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 138; accord Bilder, Transatlantic
Constitution, 74.
61. The relevant language appeared in the Grant of the Province of Maine from Charles I
to the Duke of York and reserved to the Crown "ye receiving hearing and determining of the
appeal and appeales of all or any person or persons, of in or belonging to ye territoryes or
islands aforesaid in or touching any judgment or sentence to be there made or given" (Grant
of the Province of Maine (1664), in Francis Newton Thorpe, The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories,and
Colonies Now or Heretofore Formingthe United States of America, Compiled and Edited
Under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906 [Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909], 3:163839); see also Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 53.
62. See Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 40-41. Opponents of this expanded royal
power, among the most vocal of which were Connecticut and Massachusetts, countered
by arguing that the Crown possessed appellate jurisdiction only to the extent that such jurisdiction was expressly reserved by charter. Absent a specific reservation of appellate power
to the Crown as was found, for example, in the charter of the proprietary colony of
Pennsylvania ("Saving and reserving to Us, Our heires and Successors, the receiving, heareing, and determining of the appeale and appeales of all or any Person or Persons, of, in, or
belonging to the Territories aforesaid, or touching any Judgement to bee there made or
given"), opponents of royal appellate power argued that Privy Council had no business
reviewing the decisions of colonial courts (Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania
(1691), in Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 5:3038). Massachusetts judges apparently felt little compunction to assist parties in bringing appeals-those who sought appeal
from the decisions of the colony's highest court were often frustrated by the court's refusal to
provide a written record or to order execution of its final judgment; see William E. Nelson,
Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts
Society, 1760-1830 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 16. Crown officials
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Along with these assertions of royal appellate power following the 1675
and 1696 reorganizations, the Crown argued during the same period for an
increasingly robust power of legislative review. As was the case with judicial review, this flexing of imperial muscle through legislative review
aroused a storm of controversy. No monarch deployed the analogous domestic power to strike down parliamentary legislation after 1707, by which
time colonists had begun to feel keenly any metropolitan challenge to
the authority of their local assemblies. 63 Intent on checking those assemblies' pretensions to power, imperial administrators ordered colonial governors in royal and proprietary colonies automatically to veto certain
categories of local legislation. In addition, imperial officials increasingly
required that colonial legislation include suspending clauses, which made
the enactment of such legislation contingent on Privy Council approval. 64
The statutory basis for this power of legislative review was the ninth section of the "Act for Preventing Frauds, and Regulating Abuses in the
Plantation Trade," which provided, in relevant part,
That all Lawes By-lawes Usages or Customes att this tyme or which hereafter
shall bee in practice or endeavoured or pretended to be in force or practice in
any of the said Plantations which are in any wise repugnant to the before
mentioned Lawes or any of them soe far as they doe relate to the said
Plantations or any of them or which are wayes repugnant to this present
Act or to any other Law hereafter to be made in this Kingdome soe farr as
such Law shall relate to and mention the said Plantations are illegal null
65
and void to all Intents and Purposes whatsoever.
In addition, most colonial charters contained provisions prohibiting the
enactment of laws that were contrary or repugnant to the laws of
England. 66 The charter of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example,
included a clause permitting the governor and company "to make Lawes
and Ordinances for the Good and Welfare of the saide Company, and
for the Government and ordering of the saide Landes and Plantacon, and
the People inhabiting and to inhabite the same, as to them from tyme to
tyme shalbe thought meete, soe as such Lawes and Ordinances be not

strenuously resisted such interpretations, fueling a dispute that lasted well into the eighteenth
century.
63. See Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, 67.
64. Ibid.
65. 7 and 8 Wm.III, c. 22 [1696].
66. See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council, 525. Rhode Island was an exception: the
terms of its charter did not require acts of the colonial assembly to be reviewed by the
Privy Council before taking effect; see Bilder, TransatlanticConstitution, 55-56.
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contrarie or repugnant to the Lawes and Statuts of this our Realme of
67
England.
The roots of the Privy Council's legislative review lay beyond the
boundaries of the mainland North American colonies, in earlier English
imperial projects. Ex ante legislative review by the Crown had originated
in 1494 with the efforts of Henry VII to subdue Ireland by mandating
that all acts of the Irish Parliament be approved by the English king and
his council before passing into law. This requirement, known as
Poynings's Law, endured until 1782.68 Closer to the American case in
both space and time was the situation of Jamaica, which in the 1670s
attracted the attention of the Lords Committee for Trade and Plantations,
which targeted the Caribbean colony as the first test case for the new policy
of tightening the leash on colonial legislatures. 69 With precedents such as
these, the purpose of legislative review of colonial statutes appeared clear
to American colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: to subordinate local assemblies to the twofold jurisdiction of royal prerogative
and. imperial administration.

Defeat of Madison's Negative
In 1787, the long history of Privy Council review formed an important part
of the U.S. constitutional landscape. Madison explicitly drew on this precedent as he marshaled his arguments for giving the general government of
the United States the power to negative state laws. But why look to a cornerstone of British imperial organization when searching for models of
government for the new republic? Put simply, Madison believed that
what had been lacking in every other confederacy in history was also lacking in the American Confederation, but that it had been present under the
British Empire: a firm authority emanating from the center, establishing the
foundational rules of union and policing the extremes of the states' behavior. "Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given
on paper will be evaded & defeated," Madison wrote. "The States will continue to invade the national jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of
nations & to harrass [sic] each other with rival and spiteful measures
67. Massachusetts Bay Charter (1629), in Thorpe, Federaland State Constitutions,3:1857
(emphasis added). The subsequent Massachusetts charter of 1691 provided that colonial acts
would take effect if the Crown did not take contrary action within a set time period; see
Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 66.
68. 10 Hen. VII, c. 4 (1485); repealed 21 & 22 Geo. III, c. 47 (1781).
69. See Bilder, TransatlanticConstitution, 54-55; Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings,
61-65.
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dictated by mistaken views of interest."70 In short, Madison believed that
the lessons of the empire could be applied to the problem of authority in
the American republic.
Moreover, Madison's words demonstrate that he had imperial practice in
mind when he conceived the notion of the federal negative-recall his recommendation to Washington of a "negative in all cases whatsoever on the
legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative. ' 71 Madison envisioned the federal negative functioning in the
same manner as the Privy Council's practice of reviewing statutes ex
ante, in a general posture, before they could be applied in individual
cases or challenged by specific parties. He thus selected one of the two
strands of British imperial practice and sought to graft it onto the revised
American charter-without adopting what legal historians have generally
recognized as the Privy Council's embryonic power of judicial review, 72
Madison endorsed its alternative procedure of legislative review. Just as
the pre-Revolutionary Privy Council had periodically reviewed new colonial acts to gauge whether they were repugnant to English law, the newly
minted general government of the United States would possess a procedural mechanism by which to "prevent encroachments by the states on
each other and on the general government itself. '73 As Lance Banning
notes, historians of the Founding period cannot help being surprised at
the degree to which Madison based the architecture of his constitution
upon a foundation built in England: "It is stunning to remark how clearly
he was thinking, at this point, of a republican replacement for the old
imperial regime, complete with the prerogative to overturn provincial legislation that was incompatible with the requirements of the 'empire' as a
74
whole."
To be sure, Madison's theory did diverge somewhat from British imperial practice. Most significantly, the plan aimed to remedy not just the
binary problem of state laws that ran afoul of the laws of the general government-analogous to the imperial problem of colonial acts that conflicted with English law-but the more complex challenge of state laws
that suppressed the will of minorities within a given state or trenched on
the laws of other states. The federal negative would give the general government the power to police both a state's relationship with its inhabitants
and its relationship with its fellow states. Consider the litany of woes that
70. Madison to Washington, April 16, 1787, PJM, 9:383-84.
71. Madison to Washington, April 16, 1787, PJM, 9:383.
72. See, for example, Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council; see also Black, "Constitution
of Empire"; McIlwain, High Court of Parliament.
73. See Zuckert, "System without Precedent," 144.
74. Banning, Sacred Fire of Liberty, 126-27.
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Madison outlined in his letter to Washington, cited above, that would result
if the general government lacked such a power: "The States will continue
to invade the national jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of nations
& to harrass each other with rival and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views of interest."'75 Invasions of the national jurisdiction, violations of
treaties and the law of nations-these, clearly, are conflicts on the national
level, classic examples of matters within the purview of the general govemment of even the weakest confederacy. 76 But laws passed by one state that

had the effect of harassing other states? This was something new, something that had not been contemplated by the Privy Councillors.
For Madison, this state-on-state aggression was the real danger, because
in his view the states simply could not be trusted to behave themselves. A
balancing agent would have to be found. And Madison found it in the
mechanism of the federal negative. "The great desideratum which has
not yet been found for Republican Governments," he wrote to
Washington, "seems to be some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in
disputes between different passions & interests in the State."'77 A son of
the Enlightenment, Madison embraced the era's vision of passions and
interests as equal and countervailing elements of individual and social
life, with important consequences for political order. 78 The federal negative
would import the Privy Council's legislative review mechanism to
American shores, establishing the central government as an umpire over
the fractious states with authority to oversee both their internal actions
(e.g., "oppressing the minority within themselves") and their external
actions (e.g., "thwarting and molesting each other," "invad[ing] the
79
national jurisdiction," and "violat[ing] treaties and the law of nations").
75. Madison to Washington, April 16, 1787, PJM, 9:384.
76. For example, the Holy Roman Empire, a loose confederation in Madison's own time,
exercised authority over imperial legislation, treaties, and declarations of war; see "Notes on
Ancient and Modem Confederacies," PJM, 9:19. Several decades previously, John Locke
had listed such powers among the "federative powers" of the commonwealth, which he
defined as relating to "the management of the security and interest of the public without"
(John Locke, Second Treatise of Government [1690; reprint, with an introduction by
C. B. Macpherson, Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1980], 77).
77. Madison to Washington, April 16, 1787, PJM, 9:384.
78. See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: PoliticalArguments for
Capitalism Before Its Triumph, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1997), 47.
79. See Madison to Jefferson, March 19, 1787, PJM, 9:318 ("oppressing" and "thwarting
and molesting"); Madison to Washington, April 16, 1787, PJM 9:384 ("invad[ing]" and
"violat[ing]"). Here I differ markedly from Banning, who argues that "Madison's reference
to a 'dispassionate umpire' over contending interests applies specifically and solely to a federal referee over contentions within individual states," and that therefore "he does not envision a federal legislature capable of dispassionately supervising national conflicts of interest"
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Outside the confines of Madison's study, however, the negative looked
to some contemporaries like little more than a rehash of imperial procedure. Upon hearing rumors of Madison's scheme in April 1787, one
month before the assembling of the Philadelphia convention, Virginia
representative William Grayson wrote to William Short, Jefferson's secretary in Paris: "Some of the gentlemen of the convention are here and I
have conversed freely with them as to the reform; they are for going in
a great way: some of them are for placing Congress in loco of the King
of G.B.-besides their present powers: for giving them a perpetual duty
on imports and exports. Figure to yourself how the States will relish the
idea of a negative on their laws." 80 Grayson's meaning was clear-with
its combination of increased central power over states' actions and an
imperial lineage, Madison's negative immediately raised suspicions
among some of his fellow statesmen.
The Virginia delegation to the Philadelphia convention, however,
embraced the federal negative. Between May 14 and May 25, prior to
the first meeting of the Convention, the Virginia delegates met informally
and began to hammer out a blueprint for governmental reform. Presented to
the Convention by Virginia governor Edmund Randolph on May 29, the
scheme became known as the Virginia Plan. Although the authorship of
the plan cannot be determined, the provisions closely tracked Madison's
proposals as outlined in his letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and
Washington in March and April. 8 1 The assembled Convention quickly
accepted the Virginia Plan as the initial template for reform and basis
for debate. Most notable for our purposes was paragraph 6:
Resolved that each branch [of the national legislature] ought to possess the
right of originating Acts; that the national Legislature ought to be impowered
to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation &
moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the

articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union agst. any
member
82
of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.
(Banning, Sacred Fire of Liberty, 445n52). In both the March 19 letter to Jefferson and the
April 16 letter to Washington, however, Madison seems clearly to contemplate that the
federal negative would apply to inter- as well as intrastate conflicts.
80. Grayson to Short, April 16, 1787, in Letters of Members of the Continental Congress,
8:581.
81. See Editorial Note, PJM, 10:12-13.
82. "The Virginia Plan," PJM, 10:16 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the scope of the
negative as set forth in the Virginia Plan was narrower than Madison's earlier formulations

476

Law and History Review, May 2010

When discussion of the plan began on May 3 1, one provision of paragraph 6 sparked debate: the grant of lawmaking power to Congress in
all cases with regard to which the states lacked competence. Several delegates took issue with the vagueness of the provision and argued that it
threatened to strip the states of jurisdiction. Yet the subsequent clause,
which set forth the federal negative, elicited no debate at all. Madison's
notes, considered "the standard authority for the proceedings of the
Convention," have this to say: "The other clauses giving powers necessary
to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat Leg the articles of Union down to the last
clause ... were agreed to [without] debate or dissent. '83 Madison's federal
negative had cleared its first hurdle. Over the course of the next two weeks,
however, as the delegates debated the Virginia Plan in depth, the negative
would face much more rigorous challenge.
Paragraph 6 was not the only provision of the Virginia Plan that contemplated ex ante review of legislation. Paragraph 8 proposed "that the
Executive and a Convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to
compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of
the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular
Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final."'84 As had been the
case under the empire, a quasi-executive, quasi-judicial body would assess
a new act before it became operable to determine whether the law comported with a more general, overarching body of law. In contrast to the
Privy Council's legislative review and Madison's federal negative, the
council of revision would function both horizontally (national authorities
evaluating national laws) and vertically (national authorities evaluating
state laws), passing judgment on the actions of states (the "particular legislatures") as a supplement to the congressional negativing power. Yet the
purpose of the council of revision and the negative was similar: to import
imperial practice to the United States as a means of checking wayward

had contemplated. Although the plan's language referred to laws "contravening in the
opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union," Madison's proposal in his earlier
letter to Jefferson had given the central government broader power to negative "in all cases
whatsoever" (Madison to Jefferson, March 19, 1787, PJM,9:318). Madison did not endorse
this alteration, as will be discussed further below.
83. Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1966), l:xvi, 54 (brackets showing Madison's revisions of ca.
1821 omitted). Farrand's authoritative four-volume Records of the Federal Convention
includes the notes taken by several delegates to the Convention but consistently treats
Madison's as the most accurate and comprehensive.
84. "Virginia Plan," PJM, 10:16.
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majorities that, like the colonial
assemblies, might be prone to an excess of
85
democracy or self-interest.
Jack Rakove finds a link between paragraph 6 and paragraph 8 based on
their shared suspicion of legislatures qua legislatures, arguing that
"Madison thought that unchecked legislatures posed the greatest threats
to the constitution of any republic." 86 While Madison certainly feared

that a legislature citing a popular mandate might overrun the other branches
of government, the sixth and eighth paragraphs shared another common
theme: both offered procedural, institutional solutions to the problem of
mediating among multiple levels of authority. Taken together, these key
elements of the Virginia Plan sought to grant Congress ongoing supervisory power over the state legislatures, and to create in the council of revision a supralegislative body with immense power, not merely over specific
parties or cases but over the lawmaking process itself. In so doing,
Madison-the architect of the Virginia Plan-again borrowed from
British imperial precedents in constructing the new government. As had
been the case under British rule, a hybrid council would measure new leg-

islative acts against a preexisting set of general principles, and the remedy

87
for acts repugnant to those principles would be to void them ab initio.

Rather than relying on a body of substantive, supreme national law,
then, the Virginia Plan attempted to solve the problem of central authority
85. The Philadelphia convention was not the first instance in which a council of revision
was considered. The New York constitution of 1777 featured such a council, and the
Virginia legislature had contemplated adopting a similar measure in 1782-83; see
"Virginia Plan," PJM, 10:17n3; see also Alfred B. Street, The Council of Revision of the
State of New York (Albany, N.Y.: William Gould, 1859); Wood, Creation of the
American Republic, 435-36, 455.
86. Rakove, James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic, 73. Madison's
uneasy attitude toward legislative power manifested itself most strongly in his Federalist
essays; see Federalist48 (Cooke), 334: "Where the legislative power is exercised by an
assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confidence for its own strength ...it is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that
the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions."
87. Richard Henry Lee had made a similar point in a May 1787 letter to George Mason:
"Do you not think, sir, that it ought to be declared, by the new system, that any state act of
legislation that shall contravene, or oppose, the authorized acts of Congress, or interfere with
the expressed rights of that body, shall be ipso facto void, and of no force whatsoever" (Lee
to Mason, May 15, 1797, in The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, ed. James Curtis Ballagh
[New York: Da Capo, 1970], 2:422). Lee's belief that unconstitutional state laws were
void ab initio seems to have led him to a different conclusion from Madison's, however.
Both Lee and Mason ultimately opposed the Constitution on the ground that it granted
too much power to the central government. From this result, it is possible to interpolate
that Lee thought that unconstitutional state laws were by definition void and therefore that
no decree of invalidity was necessary from Congress.

478

Law and History Review, May 2010

through structural mechanisms dictating the relationship among different
88
legislative powers.
Following the relatively warm reception that it received on May 31, the
federal negative remained in the background of the Convention's discussions until June 8. On that day, the negative dominated debate. South
Carolinian Charles Pinckney opened the proceedings with a motion
expanding the scope of the negative to encompass any state law that
Congress judged "improper." According to Madison's notes, Pinckney
argued "that under the British Govt. the negative of the Crown had been
found beneficial, and the States are more one nation now, than the
Colonies were then." 89 The Virginia Plan, in contrast, had limited the negative to state laws that in Congress's judgment contravened the articles of
union-in other words, laws that were unconstitutional. Madison, whom
some scholars suspect of colluding with Pinckney (his fellow lodger at
Mary House's rooms at the comer of Fifth and Market streets), seconded
90
the motion.
Despite his considerable influence on the drafting of the Virginia Plan,
Madison soon made it clear that he advocated a much broader negative
than the one outlined in the proposal. 9' Only two days after making his
first major speech in the Convention, Madison cataloged the benefits of
the negative for his fellow delegates, which he now believed ought to be
"lodged in the senate alone."'92 According to his notes of the debates, in
which he consistently referred to himself in the third person, Madison
issued the following opening salvo: "He could not but regard an indefinite
power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a
perfect system. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to
88. This distinction between structural and substantive approaches to authority is conceptually similar to Daniel Hulsebosch's distinction between "jurisdictional" and "jurisprudential" visions of law. According to the former, as articulated by Sir Edward Coke, "the
common law was inseparable from the institutions that applied, practiced, and taught the
common law." A jurisprudential notion of law, in contrast, "refers to a rationally organized
body of rules and principles defined primarily in reference to each other, not to the remedies
and personnel enforcing them" (Daniel J. Hulsebosch, "The Ancient Constitution and the
Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence," Law and History Review
21 [2003]: 445-46).
89. Farrand, Records, 1:164.
90. See Hobson, "Negative on State Laws," 266; Marty D. Matthews, Forgotten Founder:
The Life and Times of Charles Pinckney (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
2004), 40, 45.
91. Charles Hobson speculates that the limited negative outlined in the Virginia Plan was
the work of Randolph and George Mason; see Hobson, "Negative on State Laws," 266.
92. Madison Chronology, PJM, I0:xxv; Farrand, Records, 1:168, Madison's Notes, June
8, 1787.
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encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties, to infringe
the rights & interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within
their respective jurisdictions. A negative was the mildest expedient that
could be devised for preventing these mischiefs. ' ' 93 If any doubt had
existed as to Madison's position on the proper solution to the problem
of authority, this speech shattered it.
Madison's remarks also invoked several shibboleths of imperial practice
that likely would have resonated with his audience. For example, by speaking in the language of "encroachments," Madison signaled his debt to the
Privy Council's mode of reviewing proposed legislation. 94 His subsequent
comments coupled imperial argot with the astronomical vernacular popular
among the members of the Founding generation: "This prerogative of the
General Govt. is the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of
their proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political system." ' 95 Just as the royal prerogative, via the Privy Council, had restrained
the centrifugal, heterogeneous tendencies of the colonies by compelling
their laws to conform to English norms, the republican prerogative, via
Congress, would keep the states from spinning into the turmoil that had
characterized the Confederation.
For Madison, then, the term "prerogative" did not inspire immediate horror, as it had for some of his fellow Revolutionaries, for whom the term
conjured images of the seventeenth-century struggles with the Stuart monarchs over the extent of kingly power. 96 On the contrary, Madison's vision
of prerogative as the source of the federal negative, and therefore as the
cure for confederal chaos, was benign, even salutary. Nor does Madison
appear to have been troubled by the distinction between royal and legislative sources of prerogative power for the Privy Council and the negativewielding Congress, respectively. For Madison, the relevant characteristic
of both legislative review by the Privy Council and the federal negative
was that each offered an opportunity for one lawmaking body to oversee
93. Farrand, Records, 1:164.
94. Michael Zuckert makes the connection to encroachments explicit, noting that Madison
"conceived the Congress of the general government playing the role in the American system
that the king played in the British empire through his veto power over the laws of the individual legislatures of the empire. That royal veto could be and in fact was used to prevent
encroachments of the sort Madison feared" (Zuckert, "System without Precedent," 145).
95. Farrand, Records, 1:165, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
96. Acrimony over the scope of the royal prerogative dated back to the English Civil War
and the Glorious Revolution, see Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 55-93; Edmund S. Morgan,
Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (New York:
Norton, 1988); J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of
English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Norton, 1967), 233-36.
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the activities of another. Whether the inferior body was a colonial assembly
or a state legislature mattered little. The key element in both the imperial
and the Madisonian systems was that lawmaking was at least a two-step
process, requiring the assent (even if through inaction) of a superior entity
in order to make legislation complete.
Madison's argument for the broadest possible version of the federal
negative galvanized his fellow delegates. Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts.objected, seemingly to the federal negative in any form, saying, "The Natl. Legislature with such a power may enslave the States."
James Wilson of Pennsylvania endorsed the proposal, however, even
Pinckney's broader version. "A definition of the cases in which the
Negative should be exercised, is impracticable," Wilson insisted. "A discretion must be left on one side or the other[. W]ill it not be most safely
lodged on the side of the Natl. Govt.?"' 97 Invoking the same type of internal
strife and external vulnerability that Madison had diagnosed as afflicting
the ancient and modem confederacies, Wilson continued:
We must remember the language with wh. we began the Revolution, it was
this, Virginia is no more, Massachusetts is no more-we are one in name, letus be one in Truth & Fact-Unless this power is vested in the Gen]. Govt. the
States will be used by foreign powers as Engines agt the Whole-New States
will be soon formed, the Inhabitants may be foreigners and possess foreign
their State laws they may involve
affections, unless the Genl. Govt. can check
98
the Nation in Tumult and Confusion.
Wilson, a Scot who had emigrated to America in 1765 at the age of
twenty-three, placed enormous importance on union and security. The
imperial heritage of the federal negative does not appear to have troubled
him.
Madison's remarks at the close of the June 8 debate confirm the broad
scope of his plan to reshape the relationship between the states and the general government. The key institutions in this relationship were to be the legislatures, and the node connecting the two levels of legislature was to be
the negative. As Madison later explained in his October 24 letter to
Jefferson, he concurred with Wilson's statement in the Convention that
"it will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare
it void when passed." 99 Indeed, Madison suggested that the very existence
of the negative would deter state legislatures from passing questionable
acts in the first place. "The existence of such a check would prevent
97.
98.
99.
1787,

Farrand, Records, 1:165-66, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
Ibid., 1:172, Rufus King's Notes, June 8, 1787.
Ibid., 1:391, Madison's Notes, August 23, 1787. Madison to Jefferson, October 24,
PJM, 10:211.
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attempts to commit" offenses against either the nation or the other states, he
10 0
argued.
Other delegates were less convinced of the need for ex ante legislative
review. "The proposal of it would disgust all the States," Gouvemeur
Morris argued. "A law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the
Judiciary departmt. and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a
Nationl. law."''1 1 Morris, like many of his colleagues, endorsed a vision
of state and national governments as interlocking at several points: first,
at the moment when an injured party brought a judicial action seeking
relief from a state law pursuant to the supremacy clause; and second, at
the moment when Congress repealed the offending state law. This interlocking approach contrasted with Madison's vision of two parallel systems
that crossed only at the single moment when Congress considered whether
10 2
to give validity to a state act.
Furthermore, Madison's comments suggest that he envisioned the legislatures operating almost as a single system-a compound legislature comprising inferior and superior bodies. Such a system required the approval of
the superior body to give effect to any piece of legislation. Thus, in
response to criticisms that the negative would create delay and uncertainty
while Congress considered a given state law, Madison linked the need
for speedy action by the general government with ongoing oversight of
state lawmaking processes. "The case of laws of urgent necessity must
be provided for by some emanation of the power from the Natl. Govt.
into each State so far as to give a temporary assent at least," he stated.
"This was the practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution and
would not have been inconvenient; if the supreme power of negativing
had been faithful to the American interest, and had possessed the necessary
10 3
information."'
The assumption that the assent of the general government was necessary
for state laws to be effective and the consequent call for the "emanation" of
national power into the states demonstrate that the negative was merely one
side of an affirmative congressional power to ratify state legislation.
Indeed, Madison appears to have envisioned that congressional approval
(which, paradoxically, could be manifested only negatively; that is, by
Congress's declining to use its power to veto a state act) would function
100. Farrand, Records, 1:164, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
101. Ibid., 2:28, Madison's Notes, July 17, 1787.
102. Michael Zuckert makes a similar point, noting that according to Madison's view, "for
the sake of the separateness and independent operation of the different governments,
the governments must occasionally operate on each other" (Zuckert, "System without
Precedent," 144).
103. Farrand, Records, 1:168, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
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as a necessary final step in the legislative process. "The States [could]
of themselves pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a
Legislature where there are two branches can proceed without the other,"
he insisted. 104 The negative, in other words, gave the national government
a permanent option to intervene in the state lawmaking process. Absent
some form of assent by the general government, state laws would be
incomplete and invalid-just as disapproval (or, in the case of colonies
with suspending clauses, mere silence) from the Privy Council had
annulled provincial legislation.
Madison's comments on June 8 made clear the political and historical
precedents that informed his proposal. But for a misalignment of interests
between metropolitan authorities and colonial assemblies, he seemed to
say, Privy Council review would not have been at all onerous. By the
end of the colonial period imperial review might have become corrupt or
misguided in reality, but the principle of supremacy on which that review
was based, and the mechanism of review itself, survived intact. Therefore,
Madison contended, it was an appropriate means of establishing an analogous supremacy in the United States. When the vote came at the end of
that day's session, however, Madison's arguments had not prevailed.
Pinckney's motion to expand the scope of the proposed negative
failed
10 5
by a vote of seven to three, with one state's delegation divided.
After the June 8 debate, the tide seems to have turned decidedly against
Madison. Eight days later, when the delegates took up the original, limited
negative as set forth in the Virginia Plan and endorsed in the June 13 report
of the committee of the whole, John Lansing of New York and Luther
Martin of Maryland spoke against the proposal.10 6 Although Wilson parried their criticisms, the tenor of the debate had shifted. To be sure, the
report of the committee of the whole had largely adopted the Virginia
Plan, ostensibly a triumph for Madison. 10 7 But the defeat of the broader
version of the negative, combined with the introduction of William
Paterson's decentralizing New Jersey Plan on June 15, halted the momentum that had been propelling the Virginia Plan-and with it the federal
negative-forward. Madison believed that the limited negative was
104. Ibid., 1:165, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
105. Ibid., 1:168: The seven states whose delegations voted against the motion were
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia. Voting in favor were Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. The Delaware
delegation was split.
106. See Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1937; reprint, New York:
Barnes & Noble, 1967), 317.
107. The editors of the Papersof James Madison refer to June 13 as the "high point" of
Madison's influence at the Convention (Editorial Note, PJM, 10:3).
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insufficient to stave off the evils that had dogged the ancient and modem
confederations, including the American Confederation. Nevertheless, he
kept fighting. Even a limited negative was preferable to the New Jersey
Plan's proposed return to a loose confederation of minimally connected
states.
The defeat of the broader negative on June 8, however, portended the
provision's ultimate fate. Despite Randolph's last-ditch effort to give states
a right of appeal to the federal judiciary following an adverse exercise of
the negative-a naked attempt to bridge the large state-small state rift
10 8
that the New Jersey Plan had highlighted-the negative was doomed.
On July 17, in a vote of 7 to 3, the delegates voted to reject the negative. 10 9
Aside from a short-lived attempt by Pinckney to revive the measure on
August 23, this spelled the end of Madison's proposal."I 0
How had Madison lost what he viewed as a crucial battle? What
accounts for the shift in opinion that transformed the success of May 31
into the rout of July 17? Although it is impossible to identify with certainty
the cause of the negative's downfall, one potential explanation stems from
the rhetoric that Madison employed when he discussed the proposal in the
Convention. With his speech of June 8, which tied the negative closely to
imperial practice, Madison may have planted the seed of opposition in his
colleagues' minds. By explicitly noting that a mechanism very similar to
the negative "was the practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution,"
Madison invited his fellow delegates to put themselves back in the place
of colonists seeking the approval of their imperial masters. Although
some observers may have agreed with Virginia congressional representative Edward Carrington's conviction that "the negative which the King
of England had upon our Laws was never found to be materially inconvenient," others such as John Lansing viewed the plan to imitate the Privy
Council more critically: "Such a Negative would be more injurious than
that of Great Britain heretofore was.""' Delegates who already feared
what they viewed as the centralizing tendency of the Convention could
not have been comforted by the prospect of the national government's
108. See Warren, Making of the Constitution, 317.

109. Farrand, Records, 2:28, Madison's Notes, July 17, 1787. The votes broke down
slightly differently from those cast on June 8. Voting in favor of the negative were
Massachusetts, Virginia, and North Carolina; voting against were Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia. The New York delegation had collapsed shortly before, when Robert Yates and John Lansing had walked out,
leaving only Hamilton.
110. Madison's Notes, August 23, 1787, PJM, 2:390-91.
111. Farrand, Records, 3:39, Carrington to Jefferson, June 9, 1787; Farrand, Records,
1:337, Madison's Notes, June 20, 1787.
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having a veto over state laws. Madison's overt references to the negative's
origins in British imperial practice might have seemed a harbinger of, as
Martin put it, "the destruction of the State governments, and the introduc2
tion of monarchy."'
To be sure, other factors contributed to the defeat of the federal negative.
For example, in the June 8 vote on the Pinckney proposal to broaden the
scope of the negative, the three states whose delegations favored expansion
were also the three largest states: Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts. At that point in the Convention, the mode of representation
in Congress was still very much an open question. Proportional representation based on population appeared likely to win the day; the New Jersey
Plan, with its small-state-friendly proposal for equal representation, had not
yet been introduced. Did the delegates from the three largest states believe
that their large populations would allow them to dominate Congress and
control the deployment of the federal negative, thereby insulating their
own states' acts from review and veto? Perhaps; after all, as Martin pointed
out, as of mid-June, the Convention appeared to have reached consensus
on a plan that would have given this trio. a lock on the Senate: "Upon
this plan, the three large States, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts, would have thirteen senators out of twenty-eight, almost
one half of the whole number." Spinning out his dire scenario, Martin predicted that the powerful troika "would make what laws they pleased, however injurious or disagreeable to the other States; and that they. would
always prevent the other States from making any laws, however necessary
' 13
and proper, if not agreeable to the views of those three States.
Yet this hypothesis. cannot explain the July 17 vote, which found the
North Carolina delegation joining Virginia and Massachusetts in approving
the limited negative, while Pennsylvania moved to the opposition camp.
By that point, the New Jersey plan had played out its brief role as a rallying
point for the smaller states, and Roger Sherman's "Connecticut
Compromise," establishing a bicameral Congress with a lower house
based on proportional representation and an upper house based on equal
representation, had won the majority's support. The vote approving the
compromise plan took place on July 16, the day before the federal negative
was defeated."14 Had the acrimonious debate over representation cost so
much energy and conflict that the delegates from Massachusetts and
Virginia could no longer hope to muster support for the negative? If this
was the case, why had they now gained the backing of North Carolina?
112. Farrand, Records, 3:180, Luther Martin, "Genuine Information."
113. Ibid., 3:177. The italics are all Martin's own.
114. Farrand, Records, 2:14, Journal of the Convention, July 16, 1787.
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Support for the negative had clearly been eroding since at least June
8. Prior to that date, the assembled delegates had thought well enough
of the provision to incorporate it in the June 13 report of the committee
of the whole, which had become the blueprint for the first weeks of debate.
By mid-July, the delegates would have had the opportunity to mull over
Madison's comments linking the negative to imperial practices of review.
Had the references to the negative's British parentage ultimately poisoned
the delegates against the negative? At a minimum, judging from the comments of Lansing and Martin, emphasizing the family relationship had not
helped Madison's cause.
For many delegates, the prospect of a sweeping congressional power to
veto state laws-a power enunciated in language resembling that of the
reviled Declaratory Act, no less 1 5-threatened the integrity of the states
themselves. The breadth of the negative was particularly offensive to
these delegates. "The Natl. Legislature with such a power may enslave
the States," argued Elbridge Gerry. 116 Specifically, Gerry and others contended, granting Congress the negative would permit the general government to regulate areas of activity traditionally left to the states,
effectively usurping powers the states had claimed ever since they were
colonies chafing against parliamentary oversight. Hugh Williamson of
North Carolina, for example, based his opposition to the negative on his
belief that "the State Legislatures ought to possess independent powers
in cases purely local, and applying to their internal policy. 11 7 Even as
they drafted a new constitution, some delegates resisted the notion that
the general government ought to enjoy an ongoing, structurally guaranteed
power to intervene in states' lawmaking processes.
Opponents of the negative thus used similar language of enslavement
and encroachment to that their forbears in the 1760s and 1770s had
employed against broad metropolitan oversight. Moreover, critics of the
negative articulated similar fears of a central power bent on sowing discord
among the component polities and stifling their efforts at self-protection.
The negative, Gerry argued, "may enable the Genl. Govt. to depress a
part for the benefit of another part-it may prevent the encouragements
which particular States may be disposed to give to particular manufactures,
it may prevent the States from train[ing] their militia, and thereby establish
a military Force & finally a Despotism."' "18 In Gerry's view, the chief
danger of the negative lay in its potentially chilling effect on the states'
115.
116.
117.
118.

Kramer, "Madison's Audience," 628.
Farrand, Records, 1:165, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
Ibid., 1:171, King's Notes, June 8, 1787.
Ibid., 1:171-72.
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autonomy, creativity, and prosperity. Gunning Bedford of Delaware, meanwhile, offered a more practical critique. "How can it be thought that the
proposed negative can be exercised?" he inquired of his fellow delegates.
"Are the laws of the States to be suspended in the most urgent cases until
they can be sent seven or eight hundred miles, and undergo the deliberations of a body who may be incapable of Judging of them?" ' 19 On the contrary, Madison responded. State laws would receive timely consideration
by "some emanation of the power from the Natl. Govt. into each State
so far as to give a temporary assent at least," for which he cited "the prac20
tice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution.'
Gerry's vision of the states as possessing a discrete, spatially defined
sphere of exclusive authority echoed colonial assemblies' claims of independent regulatory power in the face of metropolitan assertions of
Parliament's supremacy. Arguments such as Bedford's, meanwhile,
resembled Revolutionary-era complaints that the king and Council neglected colonial legislation, leaving acts to languish withojut approving
them or declaring them void. The Declaration of Independence had
included just such a charge against George III: "He has refused his
Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing
importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be
obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to
them."121

Taken together, the arguments of the negative's opponents convey a
deep-seated fear of a specific array of solutions to the problem of multilayered authority. That array of solutions included prerogative-based, ex
ante review of legislation, of the type that the Privy Council had used to
invalidate colonial statutes, and more formal arrangements of hierarchical
legislatures, akin to parliamentary supremacists' account of the relationship
between Parliament and the colonial assemblies. The common element
uniting these solutions in the eyes of the negative's opponents was their
shared heritage as tools of British imperial governance. To be clear:
Gerry, Bedford, and others did not base their objections on simple animus
toward all things British. Certainly, Luther Martin did lament after the
Convention, "We were eternally troubled with arguments and precedents
from the British government."' 22 But that complaint came in the context
of a discussion of the presidential veto-a vestige of British practice that
119.
120.
121.
122.

Ibid., 1:167-68, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
Ibid., 1:168, Madison's Notes, June 8, 1787.
Declaration of Independence (1776).
Farrand Records, 3:203, Luther Martin, "Genuine Information."
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did find its way into the Constitution, and that operated at a single, horizontal level of government.' 23 Criticism of the negative, in contrast, sounded a
variety of themes but tended to focus on the same issue that had motivated
the colonists' attacks on metropolitan oversight, whether by the Privy
Council or Parliament: a multitiered governmental system built around
the superior level's sweeping power to intervene in the inferior level's legislative process. For the negative's opponents as well as the colonists, then,
the problem of multiple authorities-the central problem of the era's protofederal systems-could not be solved by merging two levels of government power into one compound legislature.

The Supremacy Clause and Judicial Review
Despite the outcome of the July 17 vote, Madison persisted in his belief
that without the federal negative, the new government risked repeating
the mistakes of the Confederation. 1 24 His exchange of letters with
Jefferson spanning the period from June to October of 1787 reveals that
Madison continued to develop his theory of the negative even after it
had faded from discussion in the Convention. Barred by Convention
rules from discussing the proceedings with outsiders, Madison did not
introduce the negative into his correspondence with his friend and mentor;
rather, it was Jefferson who broached the subject. 25 Clearly, word of
Madison's proposal had already reached Paris.' 26 In a letter dated June
20, which appears not to have reached Madison until late August or
123. Although the Constitution borrowed the executive veto from the English constitution,
it must be noted that the last instance of a royal veto was Anne's negative of the Scottish
Militia Bill in 1707.
124. Madison's August 28 comments in the Convention made clear that he had not
dropped the subject of the federal negative. During debate on a provision prohibiting the
states from issuing bills of credit in order to ensure the nation's financial stability,
Madison added this coda to his statement supporting the ban: "He conceived however
that a negative on the State laws could alone secure the effect. Evasions might and would
be devised by the ingenuity of the Legislatures" (Farrand, Records, 2:440, Madison's
Notes, August 28, 1787). The records are silent as to his fellow delegates' reactions to
this reference to the defeated negative.
125. A few days before the Convention adjourned on September 17, Madison did break
his silencc concerning the proceedings in a letter to Jefferson. After sketching the outlines of
the proposed constitution, he concluded, "I hazard an opinion nevertheless that the plan
should it be adopted will neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the
local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts agst the state governments" (Madison
to Jefferson, September 6, 1787, PJM, 10:163-64).
126. One vector that brought this news was William Grayson's April 16 letter to
Jefferson's secretary William Short; see above text accompanying note 76.
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early September, Jefferson offered his views on the proposal. 12 7 "The
negative proposed to be given [Congress] on all acts of the several legislatures is now for the first time suggested to my mind," Jefferson wrote.
"Prima facie I do not like it." Jefferson's opposition to the negative
stemmed from what he viewed as the unnecessarily broad power it gave
to Congress to insert itself into every piece of state legislation:
It fails in an essential character, that the hole & the patch should be commensurate. But this proposes to mend a small hole by covering the whole garment. Not more than 1. out of 100. state-acts concern the confederacy.
This proposition then, in order to give them 1. degree of power which they
ought to have, gives them 99. more which they ought not to have, upon a presumption that they will not exercise the 99. But upon every act there will be a
preliminary question [:] Does this act concern the confederacy? And was
there ever a proposition so plain as to pass Congress without a debate?
Their decisions are almost always wise; they
are like pure metal. But you
128
know of how much dross this is the result.
Rather than vesting Congress with this sweeping power of legislative
review, Jefferson proposed a judicial alternative: "An appeal from the
state judicature to a federal court, in all cases where the act of
Confederation controled the question." Would this judicial solution not,
he asked, "be as effectual a remedy, & exactly commensurate to the
defect"? 129 In contrast to the legislature-centered proposal put forth by

Madison the student of political science, Jefferson the lawyer proposed
that the Constitution adopt the other prong of the Privy Council's practice:
judicial review of the laws of an inferior jurisdiction by a superior court.

By early September, Madison seems to have realized that the new charter would not include the negative--"the one ingredient that in his view
was essential for establishing the supremacy of the central government
and for protecting the private rights of individuals."' 130 In response to
both this defeat and Jefferson's comments, on October 24 Madison drafted
a seventeen-page letter to Jefferson that laid out his theory of the federal
negative with great vigor and conviction. Despite the failure of such
127. Madison to Jefferson, September 6, 1787, PJM, 10:163.
128. Jefferson to Madison, June 20, 1787, PJM, 10:64.
129. Ibid.
130. Editorial Note, PJM, 10:205. At least one observer of the Convention, however, held
out hope until the final days that the delegates would see the wisdom of the negative. On
August 22, James McClurg, who had recently left the Virginia delegation, wrote to
Madison, "I still have some hope that I shall hear from you of the reinstatement of the
Negative-as it is certainly the only means by which the several Legislatures can be
restrained from disturbing the order & harmony of the whole; & the Govemmt. render'd
properly national, & one" (McClurg to Madison, August 22, 1787, PJM, 10:154).
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arguments to win converts in the Convention, Madison continued to insist
that the imperial analogy, combined with the experience of life under the
Confederation, confirmed the value of the negative. "If the supremacy of
the British Parliament is not necessary as has been contended, for the harmony of that Empire; it is evident I think that without the royal negative or
some equivalent controul, the unity of the system would be destroyed," he
argued. "The want of some such provision seems to have been mortal to
the antient Confederacies, and to be the disease of the modem.' 3 ' And
now, Madison feared, the national government's want of a power to negative harmful state legislation might prove mortal to the Republic.
Madison's letter demonstrated the continued influence of European and
American history on his political thought. Even after the defeat of the federal negative, he could not help revisiting the precedents that he believed
bolstered his case. Incorporating large segments of his "Notes on
Ancient and Modem Confederacies," the letter delineated the failings of
the United Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire, among others, as
Madison strove to convince Jefferson that the negative was necessary to
prevent both "encroachments on the General authority" and "instability
and injustice in the legislation of the States." Absent this power, he feared
that the national government would splinter into a collection of grasping,
inferior political entities. Only the negative could save the American federation from the fate of its confederal European cousins. Without the negative, the United States would be nothing more than another example of a
failed attempt at stitching multiple political entities together under a single
overarching authority. In short, absent the negative, the novel American
project was doomed to the Old World fate of becoming "a feudal system
32
of republics" rather than "a Confederacy of independent States."'
Here was the great paradox of Madison's proposal: by importing the
review procedure practiced under the empire, he hoped to cement the authority of the national government, thereby allowing the United States to
escape what he viewed as the doom of its European confederal predecessors. In other words, he sought to use one of the preeminent tools of
British imperial practice to create a unique system of American federal
government. Unfortunately for Madison, however, few of his colleagues
shared his benign view of such a plan.' 33 In response to Madison's
October 24 excursus, Jefferson's next missive made no mention of the
131. Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787, PJM, 10:210.
132. Ibid., 10:209-10.
133. Cf. Kramer, "Madison's Audience," 649-53 (positing the delegates' "insensibility to

the theory and agenda" of Madison's negative, especially the vital role that it played in his
vision of the extended republic).
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federal negative. Apparently unmoved by Madison's arguments, Jefferson's
most relevant statement on the subject of national authority over the states
echoed the concerns about overweening centralized power that his earlier
letter had raised: "I own I am not a friend to very energetic government
134
...It is always oppressive."'
Although Jefferson questioned whether the federal negative would create a too-energetic central government, the majority of Convention delegates shared Madison's desire to shore up national authority. As
Charles Warren put it, "Nearly all the delegates agreed that a curb on
State legislation must be provided in the new Constitution, but the difficult
question was: how shall it be applied? By the Legislature, in the shape of
preventive action or corrective statutes; by the Executive, in the shape
of force; or by the Judiciary, in the shape of Court decisions, in cases
involving State laws?" 135 Writing to Nicholas Trist (Jefferson's
grandson-in-law) in 1831, Madison provided a similar characterization of
the array of options that had faced the Convention. "The obvious necessity
of a controul on the laws of the States, so far as they might violate the
Constitution and laws of the U.S. left no option but as to the mode," he
wrote. "The modes presenting themselves were 1. A Veto on the passage
of the State Laws. 2. A Congressional repeal of them. 3. A Judicial annulment of them."' 136 Having eliminated the negative from consideration, the
delegates turned their attention to other mechanisms that would mediate
between state and national authority.
In the aftermath of the negative's defeat, the discussion at the
Convention turned toward an altogether different institutional approach.
Following the demise of the federal negative, with its legislative solution
to the problem of establishing. a hierarchy of authorities, the delegates
began to consider seriously the possibility of a judicial approach. As
Larry D. Kramer and other scholars have pointed out, the supremacy clause
must be seen as following from, and causally related to, the defeat of the
negative. 1 37 When they adopted it in late August, the delegates intended
the supremacy clause to do what Madison had intended the negative to do.
134. Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, PJM, 10:338. Jefferson was evidently
similarly unmoved by the arguments that another of his correspondents, James Monroe,
offered in favor of the negative. The negative, Monroe wrote, "will if [Congress] is well
organiz'd, be the best way of introducing uniformity in their proceedings that can be
devis'd" (Farrand, Records, 3:65, Monroe to Jefferson, July 27, 1787).
135. Warren, Making of the Constitution, 166.
136. Madison to Trist, December 1831, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James
Madison (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), 9:473.
137. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 74-75; Rakove, Original
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As Jefferson's June 20 letter suggests, the idea of a judicial approach to
harmonizing state and national law had been circulating at least since the
delegates convened. Most notably, the New Jersey Plan contained a provision specifying that all treaties and acts of Congress "shall be the
supreme law of the respective States" and directing that state courts
would therefore be bound by them.' 38 In a somewhat different vein, an
anonymous pamphlet published in May 1787 and attributed to John
Dickinson advocated the establishment of an "Equalizing Court" that
would provide a forum in which states could challenge congressional
acts (and, in what Dickinson implied was a secondary function,
Congress could challenge state acts). 139 Dickinson's proposal envisioned
the Equalizing Court as "an umpire between Congress and the States" to
which "an aggreived or accused State may resort for complaint, defence,
or protection." 1 40 Like the New Jersey Plan, Dickinson's scheme focused
on creating the proper forum in which disputes between state and federal
legislatures would be decided. Both plans also shared an emphasis on adjudicative proceedings, albeit with individuals as parties in the case of the
New Jersey Plan and states as parties in the Dickinson plan. And, unlike
Madison's negative, these approaches rejected the Privy Council's practice
of ex ante legislative review, instead placing the burden to challenge a particular state law on the aggrieved parties.
Madison, however, argued throughout the debates that judicial review
alone could not stave off all state legislation that encroached on the
national authority or that interfered with other states' laws. 14 1 With

Meanings, 173; Jack N. Rakove, "The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New
Contexts," Stanford Law Review 49 (1997): 1046-47; Lawrence Gene Sager, "The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts," Harvard Law Review 95
(1981): 46-47.
138. Farrand, Records, 2:245.
139. [John Dickinson], Fragments on the Confederation of the American States

(Philadelphia: Dobson, 1787), 18, 20. The essay was reprinted in the Pennsylvania
Gazette on June 6, 1787. For the attribution to Dickinson, see the headnotes to Early
American Imprints, Series I (Evans), doc. no. 20367.
140. [Dickinson], Fragmentson the Confederation, 17.

141. As the modem doctrine of federal preemption demonstrates, Madison was right to
fear that a complicated common-law (and, indeed, statutory) thicket would result from a judicial approach to policing the line between federal and state power; see, for example,
Christopher R. Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause: A Reference Guide to the United States

Constitution (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 89-127; Kenneth Starr et al., The Law of
Preemption: A Report of the Appellate Judges Conference, American Bar Association

(Chicago: American Bar Association, 1991); Joseph F. Zimmerman, Federal Preemption:
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Wilson, he objected to the New Jersey Plan's proposal to vest state courts

with the power to decide cases involving national laws.' 42 As he wrote in
his October 24 letter to Jefferson, "it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law, than to declare it void after it is passed." Madison thus
clearly still conceived of the negative's effect as rendering state legislation

void ab initio, preventing it from becoming a law in the first instance, rather
than nullifying it after the fact. As for placing the burden to challenge an
act on aggrieved individuals, Madison was dismissive: "A State which
would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very
ready to obey a Judicial decree in support of them." The result of such
intransigence on the part of a state would, he feared, ultimately lead to a

violent confrontation between state and national power-precisely the catastrophe that his proposal had aimed to prevent. Such a "recurrence to

force, which in the event of disobedience would be necessary, is an evil
which the new Constitution meant to exclude as far as possible."' 143 The

prospect of building force into the Constitution as a last resort dismayed
Madison, who had considered but ultimately rejected coercion as a tactic
44
as early as the first meeting of the Convention. 1
142. See Rakove, Original Meanings, 173. Madison and Wilson also argued that by its
own terms, the New Jersey Plan did not adequately provide a means by which the new charter would be established as the supreme law of the land. This was because the plan required
not ratification in convention but ratification by the Confederation Congress alone (ibid).
143. Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787, PJM, 10:211-12.
144. Paragraph 6 of the Virginia Plan had included a grant of power to Congress "to call
forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the
articles thereof." By May 31, however, Madison had reconsidered the coercion provision and
concluded that it was not the best way to proceed. "A Union of the States containing such an
ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction," he told the Convention. "The use of
force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous
compacts by which it might be bound." Apparently agreeing with Madison, the convention
then voted to postpone the coercion measure (Farrand, Records, 1:54, Madison's Notes, May
31, 1787).
Martin Diamond notes that by incorporating a coercion provision, the New Jersey Plan
arguably went farther toward consolidation than the Virginia Plan, a point that the Virginia
Plan's advocates did not fail to trumpet when they critiqued the New Jersey Plan. The
Virginia Plan's supporters "exulted that the pure federalists now admitted, in the New
Jersey Plan, how broad the governing powers must be to achieve the blessings of union,
and that legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government were needed for their
application," Diamond observes. Madison and others thus "pointed out that the attempt to
achieve these things by purely federal means led to Patterson's [sic] ludicrous reliance
upon military coercion, upon civil war as the means to secure the blessings of union"
(Martin Diamond, "What the Framers Meant by Federalism," in A Nation of States:
Essays on the American Federal System, ed. Robert A. Goldwin [Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1963], 38).
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By sounding the death knell for the federal negative, the July 17 vote
raised the possibility of a judicial, rather than legislative, remedy to the problem of competing state and national authorities. According to Madison's
notes, immediately following the vote on the negative, Luther Martin introduced a resolution containing language based on the New Jersey Plan.
Martin's resolution provided
that the Legislative acts of the U. S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the
articles of Union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of
the U. S. shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those
acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and inhabitants-& that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby
in their decisions, any thing in 1the
respective laws of the individual States
45
to the contrary notwithstanding.
The resolution passed unanimously. Despite the defeat of the New
Jersey Plan, its approach to the issue of national authority had triumphed.
With the approval on August 23 of John Rutledge's proposal to replace the
phrase "the Articles of Union" with the words "this Constitution" and to
relocate this reference to the national charter to the beginning of the paragraph, the provision that would become the supremacy clause passed into
46
the document that would become the Constitution.
Significantly, many delegates seem to have been willing to consider
judicial review by this point in the Convention. As Lawrence Sager has
highlighted, on August 27-four days after the delegates had agreed on
the final language of the supremacy clause-they revisited and retooled
the description of the Supreme Court's powers in what would become
145. Farrand, Records, 2:28-29, Madison's Notes, July 17, 1787. Larry Kramer suggests
that this proposal by Martin, an avowed foe of centralized power, was a gambit to move the
debate away from what Martin likely viewed as the worst-case scenario of a congressional
veto power and to adopt instead a weaker method of national oversight over state law. "From
this point on, then," Kramer argues, "the delegates assumed the existence of judicial review
over state laws in their deliberation" (Kramer, People Themselves, 75).
146. Farrand, Records, 2:389, Madison's Notes, August 23, 1787. In its final form, the
supremacy clause reads as follows: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding" (U.S. Constitution, art. 6). Madison's final reference to the negative during the Convention is almost touching. As the delegates discussed
giving the national government the power to police state export duties, Madison's notes
record that he said, "The jurisdiction of the supreme Court must be the source of redress....
His own opinion was, that this was insufficient,-. A negative on the State laws alone could
meet all the shapes which these [duties] could assume. But this had been overruled"
(Farrand, Records, 2:589, Madison's Notes, September 12, 1787).
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Article III of the Constitution.' 47 The jurisdictional language of the judiciary article was edited to conform to the language of the supremacy
clause. For example, the delegates added the phrase "under this
Constitution" to expand the Supreme Court's "arising under" jurisdiction
to include cases that were based on constitutional claims. 148 In this way,
the judiciary article was "tailored to facilitate Supreme Court enforcement"
of the supremacy clause. 149 The supremacy clause, therefore, defined the
final language of Article Ill.
Moreover, the clause's significance for vertical judicial review was clear
to the delegates. In the words of Pierce Butler of South Carolina, the
Constitution established a "Judiciary to be Supreme in all matters relating
to the General Government, and Appellate in State Controversies."' 50 The
clause thus created formal authority in the central government as well as
giving that authority an institutional home in the judiciary.
The supremacy clause, then, represented a shift in the delegates' attitude
toward the problem of multilayered authorities. With the negative, Madison
had offered a mechanism that adapted British imperial practice to the
decidedly unimperial project of embracing multiplicity. By adopting the
supremacy clause instead of the negative, the delegates turned instead
toward a vision of federal authority that relied not on legislatures, but on
judges and courts to mediate among disparate sources of law.
As for the larger issue of the relationship between American federalism
and British imperial organization, another August 27 amendment to the
draft constitution is striking. Following the approval of the changes that
brought the judiciary article into line with the supremacy clause,
Madison and Gouvemeur Morris proposed replacing the phrase "the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" with the phrase "the judicial power" in the
article's description of the scope of the Supreme Court's power. 15 1 Thus,
instead of reading, "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court
shall extend to all Cases arising under Laws passed by the legislature of
the United States" (as had an early draft), the language of the judiciary
article as approved in late August read, "The judicial power shall extend
147. Sager, "Supreme Court," 49 (noting that on August 27-the Monday following the
Thursday on which the delegates unanimously adopted amendments to the supremacy clause
that made the Constitution, as well as acts of Congress and treaties, the "supreme law of the
several States.-"the Convention spent an intense day addressing the judiciary article").
148. Ibid.; accord Farrand, Records, 2:430-31, Madison's Notes, August 27, 1787.
149. Ibid.
150. Farrand, Records, 3:103, Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, October 8, 1787; see also
Kramer, People Themselves, 280n I (listing statements by delegates acknowledging judicial
review as the most viable alternative to the federal negative).
151. See Farrand, Records, 2:430-31, Madison's Notes, August 27, 1787.
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to all cases ...arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."' 52 The
proposal passed immediately, without opposition. 53 As Julius Goebel Jr.
noted with respect to this change, "To speak of jurisdiction in terms of
national power and not of a court was a noteworthy extension of the
base of judicial authority.' 5 4 Thus extended, judicial authority in the
new republic would be qualitatively different from the judicial authority
that had underpinned Britain's American empire.
Although the contours of judicial review remained uncertain and controversial for much of the early republican period, its ascendance in the aftermath of the negative's defeat suggests that many delegates viewed it as an
explicit tool to mediate among levels of government. This was a decided
change from the more ad hoc species of judicial review that the Privy
Council exercised. The Privy Council's power of judicial review followed
from the council's role as an agent of royal prerogative, but the American
mode of review was premised on a more fundamental relationship between
judicial review and the nation itself. Federal judicial review depended on a
court, to be sure, but a court that stood for-while also creating-the judicial power of the nation itself. Imperial review, whether legislative or judicial, thought fairly small: send the law in question to the Privy Council,
and the Privy Council will say whether or not it is repugnant to the laws
of England. Federal review under the supremacy clause, in contrast,
would send the state law in question not to a mere court, but to an entirely
separate and distinct level of government, which would be embodied inbut not confined to-the Supreme Court. The power of this court would
originate in the power of the nation itself, from which the court would
derive authority to police the states.
The supremacy clause was thus an explicit statement about the nature of
the relationship between state and national levels of government. Rather
than depending on formal legal structure (the Privy Council's power to
nullify colonial acts, Congress's power to negative state laws), the federal
Union would be kept in balance by a constitutional provision that actually
invoked a new category of law-namely, the "supreme law of the land."
Rather than looking to a single institution to enforce this balance, the
Framers envisioned an independent, national judicial power that would
be the source of both substantive content and jurisdictional requirements.
Whereas the British Empire had relied on the familiar institution of
152. Compare Farrand, Records, 2:172 (version of July 24-26), with 2:600 (final version
of September 12).
153. Farrand, Records, 2:431, Madison's Notes, August 27, 1787.
154. Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 241.
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legislative power to monitor the boundaries between layers of power, the
American republic would look to a novel conception of judicial authority
itself that contained both substantive and procedural, jurisprudential and
jurisdictional, components.
Madison's Defense of His Negative-and His Name
Forty-four years after the Philadelphia convention had adjourned, Madison
continued to ponder the events that had led to the defeat of his prized negative. In an 1831 letter to Trist, the former president found himself again
compelled to take up his pen in defense of the proposal. The catalyst for
this renewal of the debate was the publication in 1821 of Robert Yates's
Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled ...for the
Purpose of Forming the Constitution of the United States. Prior to walking

out of the Convention in early July along with fellow New Yorker and
Hamilton foe John Lansing Jr., Yates had kept notes of the debates.
Yates died in 1801, but in 1821 the notes were published thanks to the
efforts of Lansing and Edmond Genet. Genet, already infamous for his
exploits as the French minister to the United States during the 1790s,
had in 1808 seen fit to break the silence that had governed the delegates
since the Convention adjourned and published portions of Yates's notes
in pamphlet form.' 55 Genet's motivation was hardly a charitable desire
to inform the public as to the goings-on at Philadelphia; rather, he hoped
to aid the fortunes of his father-in-law, New York Democratic kingpin
George Clinton, as Clinton campaigned against Madison for the presidency. Most scholars agree that as part of this project, Genet altered
156
Yates's notes to paint Madison as an extreme nationalist.
Madison objected strongly to the Secret Proceedings,which he regarded
as a deliberate attempt to smear his contributions to the Convention and,
consequently, to the formation of the Constitution. He seemed to take
greatest umbrage-as demonstrated by the amount of space he devoted
to the subject in this and other letters-at the charge that he was a consolidationist bent on giving the national government the same oppressive
power that the British government had wielded over the colonies. One
can almost hear Madison sighing from his study at Montpelier as, yet
155. For a comprehensive discussion of what became known as "the Genet affair," see
Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American
Republic, 1788-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 341-54.
156. See John P. Kaminski, review of Notes of Debates in the FederalConvention of 1787
by James Madison, ed. Adrienne Koch, Common-place 2 (July 2002); available at http://
www.common-place.org/vol-02/no-04/reviews/kaminski.shtml.
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again, he rehearsed the logic that had led him to embrace the federal negative. The Secret Proceedings, he wrote, "import 'that I was disposed to
give Congress a power to repeal State laws,' and 'that the States ought
to be placed under the controul of the Genl Gt at least as much as they
were formerly when under the British King & Parliament."' He offered
the following rebuttal:
"The opinion that the States ought to be placed not less under the Govt of the
U. S. than they were under that of G. B., can provoke no censure from those
who approve the Constitution as it stands with powers exceeding those ever
allowed by the colonies to G. B. particularly the vital power of taxation,
which is so indefinitely vested in Congs and to the claim of which by
157
G. B. a bloody war, and final separation was preferred."'
In other words, Madison argued that the Constitution as ratified gave far
greater power to the general government than the British government had
wielded over the colonies, especially with regard to the thorny issue of
taxation. 158 The structure of national power with the negative might
have been the same as the structure of imperial power, he contended, but
the scope of that power was different. In any event, he seemed to say, the
Constitution had rejected this structure in favor of an entirely new govemmental architecture. And that federal architecture bore little resemblance to
the imperial approach to the problem of establishing central authority.
Madison therefore conceded that he had modeled his federal negative on
imperial practice, but he denied that he had done so as part of a larger project of consolidating national power. His debate with Clinton's cronies
demonstrates that as late as the 1830s, U.S. political debate continued to
swirl around the influence that the Privy Council's practices had had on
Madison's thoughts on government. Freely admitting that "a negative on
157. Madison to Trist, December 1831, in Hunt, Writings of James Madison, 9:473-74.
158. Anti-Federalists and, later, Republicans made a similar point during and after the
ratification debates, arguing that the federal negative would have been preferable to the
more robust centralization embodied in the supremacy clause and promoted by the
Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall. Writing in 1828,
John Taylor of Caroline lauded the rejection of the Virginia Plan but noted that "the negative
power over state laws with which it was invested, was much less objectionable than that now
constructively contended for on behalf of the federal government" (John Taylor, New Views
of the Constitution of the United States [Washington, D.C.: Way and Gideon, 1823], 18). In

an 1833 letter in which he defended the negative, Madison cited Taylor's comments as "not
unworthy of notice" and reiterated his own oft-repeated argument for "the necessity of some
adequate mode of preventing the States, in their individual characters, from defeating the
constitutional authority of the States in their united character, and from collisions among
themselves" (Madison to Rives, October 21, 1833, in Letters and Other Writings of
James Madison, Fourth President of the United States [Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott,

1865], 4:313).
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the laws of the States, was suggested by the negative in the head of the
British Empire, which prevented collisions between the parts & the
whole, and between the parts themselves," Madison agreed with his critics'
assertion that the federal negative traced its origin to imperial practice. 159
But he rejected the charge that his proposal for the negative stemmed
from a desire to reproduce the imperial-colonial hierarchy in the form of
the new federal republic. Moreover, he scoffed at the notion that despite
its defeat, the negative had somehow infected the Constitution with the
germ of unidirectional, top-down political power. Nevertheless, as the controversy over Yates's Secret Proceedings demonstrates, nearly a halfcentury after the Philadelphia convention-even as the mounting sectional
crisis gave new urgency to balancing national and state power-some
Americans continued to associate Madison with the British Empire
based on his theory of the federal negative.

Federal in Theory and Practice
The problem of authority was the central issue for both the British Empire
and the early American republic. Madison's negative attempted to bridge
these two systems, proposing a relationship between national and state
authority that applied one of the empire's chief mechanisms to the new federal government. He had selected one strand of the Privy Council's
centuries-old practice of reviewing colonial laws, a practice that offered
no substantive rules of decision but rather process and structure alone, as
a means of bringing wayward peripheries into line with the central
authority. (Indeed, even the Privy Council's protojudicial review created
little new substantive law, insofar as it purported merely to measure colonial acts against the existing laws of England.) In proposing the federal
negative, Madison followed this procedural approach, emphasizing the
negative as a mechanism rather than any rules of deciding whether a
state law conflicted with the Constitution. In this respect the negative
shared important features with Dickinson's Equalizing Court and the
Virginia Plan's council of revision, both of which sought refuge from statenational conflict by attempting-ultimately in vain-to create an ideal
forum rather than a body of legal principles according to which cases
would be decided.
159. James Madison, "Preface to Debates in the Convention: A Sketch Never Finished nor
Applied," in Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Adrienne Koch

(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1984), 16. Madison drafted the preface between 1830
and 1836 as part of preparing his notes for publication after his death (ibid., 1).
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Of the two components of Privy Council practice, Madison had chosen
to emphasize legislative review rather than judicial review. 160 The
Constitution, however, ultimately pointed toward the opposite choice,
albeit with profound changes to give judicial review more substance than
it had ever possessed under the empire. 16 1 The supremacy clause offered
neither an architecture nor a forum for decisions but rather an affirmative
statement about the fundamental rules of the game and the power from
which those rules derived: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 162 Taken together, the supremacy
clause and Article III communicated that U.S. federalism would emanate
from a national judicial power and be based on a body of substantive
"law of the land"; indeed, the very body of substantive law that contained
the supremacy clause. 163 The defeat of the negative thus marked an important transition from a system in which multiple levels of government
existed in uneasy tension with a theoretical commitment to unitary
160. Madison did contemplate a degree of judicial review according to which courts
would be bound by the laws of the United States, but he seems quite clearly to have envisioned this as subordinate to the federal negative. "Let this national supremacy be extended
also to the Judiciary department," he wrote to Randolph. "If the judges in the last resort
depend on the States & are bound by their oaths to them and not to the Union, the intention
of the law and the interests of the nation may be defeated by the obsequiousness of the
Tribunals to the policy or prejudices of the States" (Madison to Randolph, April 8, 1787,
PJM, 9:370). As his comments regarding the limitations of ex post review show, however,
he clearly considered judicial review to be at best a supplement to the federal negative.
16 1. Following the ratification of the Constitution, the phrase "legislative review" referred
on at least one occasion to the process by which a legislature reviewed the decision of a court
in a particular case, in contrast to the earlier sense of a legislature reviewing a piece of legislation before it came into effect. This post-1787 legislative review bore little resemblance to
the Privy Council's practices or to the federal negative, since it concerned a prior judicial
decision rather than a potential act of legislation. The seminal case involving this variant
of legislative review was Calder v. Bull (1798), in which the Supreme Court permitted
the Connecticut legislature to set aside the verdict of a Connecticut probate court. As the
Supreme Court noted in a 1995 decision, Calder involved "ad hoc legislative review of individual trial court judgments"-a far cry from the programmatic review of pending legislation
that Madison's federal negative had contemplated; see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514
U.S. 211, 260 (1995) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)).
162. U.S. Constitution, art. 6, para. 2.
163. As Richard B. Bernstein notes, "by bringing the Constitution into the sphere ofjudicially enforceable law, the Supremacy Clause ensure[d] that controversies over the meaning
of the Constitution [would] resolve themselves, sooner or later, into judicial questions coming before the federal judiciary and eventually the Supreme Court" (Richard B. Bernstein,
Are We to Be a Nation? The Making of the Constitution [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1987], 174).
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sovereignty, to a system expressly designed to mediate among multiple

bases of authority.
In the federal republic, the principal institution responsible for this
mediation was to be the judiciary. Immediately following the definition
of "the supreme Law of the Land," the supremacy clause states that "the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' 64
The federal negative offered a legislative solution to the problem of coor-

dinating conflicts between the levels of government, but the supremacy
clause offered a judicial solution. This judicial approach subsequently
became the basis of U.S. federalism, as federal judicial review was
confirmed in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and deployed by the Supreme
Court in cases such as Fletcher v. Peck (1810) and Martin v. Hunter's

Lessee (1816).165 Although the nature and scope of the federal judiciary's
164. U.S. Constitution, art. 6, para. 2.
165. Judiciary Act of 1789, chap. 20, 1 Stat. 73; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the statutory basis for implementing the supremacy clause by providing, in relevant part,
where is
that a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court ... of a State ...
drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under
the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground
of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the
decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn into question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held
under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said
Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or
affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error.
(Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. 25, chap. 20, 1 Stat. 73)
Fletcher v. Peck was one of the first cases in which the Supreme Court held a state
law unconstitutional. The Court under Chief Justice John Marshall held invalid a 1796
act of the Georgia legislature revoking earlier land grants in the Yazoo River region.
The Court based its decision on the impairment to contractual obligations-in the
form of subsequent sales of the land to bona fide purchasers-that the Georgia law
would have worked (Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 135).
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee established the Supreme Court's appellate review over
state court decisions in civil cases. Like Fletcher,the Martin case involved real estate:
in this case, competing land claims between the nephew of Lord Fairfax, whose lands
the Virginia legislature had confiscated during the Revolution, and Hunter, the subsequent recipient of those lands. Writing for the Court, Justice Story held that the
Supreme Court alone had power to decide questions concerning federal law and,
more relevant for this case, federal treaties, even if those questions arose in state
court (Martin, 14 U.S. at 333-35).
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role remained controversial into the nineteenth century, the fiery debates of
that later period proceeded from the assumption that the judiciary was the
166
crucial fulcrum on which the federal-state balance pivoted.
The defeat of the negative and the adoption of the supremacy clause heralded the arrival of an explicitly judiciary-based approach to the problem of
multiple authorities. This shift in the 1780s was profoundly connected to
ideological and institutional changes dating to the proto-Revolutionary
debates of the 1760s. As colonists and royal governors confronted each
other over the legitimacy of the Stamp Act, and as provincial assemblies
and Parliament stood in altercation over the respective powers of colonial
and metropolitan legislatures, a new conception of authority was emerging
in British North America. At the core of many colonists' arguments lay the
radical assumption that multiplicity was not evidence of a defective system
of government, but rather a basis on which to build an entirely new vision
of government. Massachusetts governor Thomas Hutchinson insisted in
1773 that "it is impossible there should be two independent Legislatures
in one and the same State, for ... the two Legislative Bodies will make
two Governments as distinct as the Kingdoms of England and Scotland
before the Union."' 167 The Scots-American jurist James Wilson, in contrast,
argued that "all the different members of the British empire are distinct
states, independent of each other, but connected together under the same
sovereign in right of the same crown."' 68 As these diverging views
suggest, the Revolutionary period witnessed a profound conflict regarding
the possibility that more than one source of authority might legitimately
Prior to the Supreme Court's holdings in Fletcher and Martin, the principle ofjudicial review of state legislation by lower federal courts was established in Champion &
Dickason v. Casey, a 1792 case in which the federal circuit court for Rhode Island
(comprising the aptly named U.S. district judge Henry Marchant as well as Chief
Justice John Jay and Associate Justice William Cushing) invalidated on contracts clause
grounds a Rhode Island law that extended the period for merchant Casey to settle his
debts with London merchants Champion and Dickason (see Bilder, Transatlantic
Constitution, 193).
166. On the debates in the 1790s and 1800s concerning the organization of the federal
judiciary, see Alison L. LaCroix, "The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From
Sovereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic," Supreme Cout Review (2008): 345-94.
167. The Speeches of His Excellency Governor Hutchinson, to the General Assembly of
the Massachusetts-Bay ... With the Answers of His Majesty's Council and the House of
Representatives ... (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1773), 11.
168. "Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament," in The Works of James Wilson, ed. Robert Green McCloskey (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1967), 2:745. The advertisement that announced the publication
of this work noted that Wilson had originally written this pamphlet in 1768, during the nonimportation controversy that followed the passage of the Townshend Acts, but it was not
published until 1774.
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exist within a single government. By 1777, when the Articles of
Confederation established a union comprising fourteen separate legislatures, multiplicity had itself become a central value for many members
of the Founding generation. The ideology of early U.S. constitutionalism,
in other words, was multiplicity.
The debate over Madison's negative was the moment in which the theories that had underpinned the Revolutionary-era debates came together
with the affirmative need to build a government that took into account
the reality of postcolonial America's numerous jurisdictions. The ideology
of authority in British North America had changed dramatically in the
1760s and 1770s; the debate over the negative showed that the structure
of that authority-the form it took on the ground-was equally unsettled.
One of the most pressing questions facing the delegates in Philadelphia
was thus how to translate a broad commitment to multiplicity into a functioning government. Given a more or less shared conviction that a single
government might contain more than one level of authority, what institutions would best allow these authorities to remain distinct while also providing for occasional interactions between them?
For Madison, the solution was to borrow the Privy Council's power to
review colonial statutes, putting Congress in the place of the Council as
the final arbiter and enactor of state law. As with the Privy Council's process, Congress's review would operate prospectively; its approval would
be necessary to complete the legislation in question, as had been the
case when the council reviewed legislation from a colony with a suspending clause in its charter. Moreover, had Madison succeeded in securing the
broadest possible form of the negative, granting Congress the ability to
intervene "in all cases whatsoever," Congress could have blocked any
state law with which it disagreed, exercising a preemptive reach far greater
than the contours of the powers that were eventually allocated to Congress
under Article I of the Constitution. 169 In addition to the finished
Constitution's requirements of bicameralism and presentment to make congressional legislation effective, Madison's proposal would have made congressional approval-in the form of silence-a prerequisite to make state
legislation effective. This broadest possible negative would have

169. The connection between the negative and Congress's affirmative lawmaking power is
evident throughout the records of the Convention. For example, the July 17 vote that
defeated the negative followed immediately on a vote approving a motion to give
Congress the power "to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and
also in those to which the States are separately incompetent or in which the harmony of
the U. States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation" (Farrand,
Records, 2:26, Madison's Notes, July 17, 1787).
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inextricably bound the two levels of lawmaking power together, eliminating any meaningful distinction between the scope of congressional power
on one hand and state legislative power on the other.
Despite Madison's efforts, his fellow delegates ultimately decided not to
adopt the compound legislative structure that the negative offered. Instead,
blending the Virginia Plan's concern with national power to the New
Jersey Plan's preference for courts as mediating institutions, they cobbled
together a structure that in turn refined the ideology of multiplicity. This
structure centered on the supremacy clause, which bound state court judges
to follow congressional statutes, treaties, and the Constitution itself. In contrast to the negative, courts and judges would be the mediating agents
between the national and state governments, ensuring the supremacy of
the general government in its particular areas of competence while minimizing the size of the shadow that national oversight cast onto the states.
Moreover, in conjunction with the enumerated powers of Article I,
Section 8, the supremacy clause-plus-judicial review solution maintained
an important degree of separation between national and state lawmaking
processes. The negative implied concurrence: every matter that the states
could reach and regulate could also be reached and regulated by
Congress by virtue of its power to negate state laws. Reading the supremacy clause in conjunction with the rest of the Constitution, meanwhile,
told a different, more complicated story. The supremacy clause identified
and created a body of supreme law of the land that was, according to
Article I, circumscribed along subject-specific lines such that there was
no concurrence with the substantive areas of state law.
To be sure, the clause also looked to judges in the states to enforce this
supreme law of the land, setting up a procedural overlap between the two
levels of government. For this reason, Bernard Bailyn describes the supremacy clause as "linking the states' officers, no less than the nation's
officers, to the enforcement of federal law," resulting in "a functional merger of-not conflict between-the two levels of authority."170 But Bailyn's
point overlooks the change that the supremacy clause represented from the
nearly total merger that Madison's negative entailed, with its compound
state-law-making process. Furthermore, the conflict-merger dichotomy
misses the distinction that the supremacy clause offered between the two
levels of authority as a matter of substantive law, despite the procedural
overlap that followed from the involvement of the state judges. The judges
might be nodes of connection between the functional levels of government,
but their more significant role was as nodes of separation between the

170. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 358.
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supreme (national, enumerated) law17of the land and the ordinary (state) law
that operated in all other contexts. '
The rejection of the negative and the turn toward a judiciary-centered
solution to the problem of authority thus signaled a transformation in
U.S. constitutional thought. The radical concept of multiplicity that undergirded Revolutionary challenges to unitary authority had demanded robust
new structures to replace the tentative efforts of the Articles of
Confederation. In this way, the new ideology of multiplicity had both created and required new institutions, setting the scene for the Convention's
confrontation between the negative and the supremacy clause. With the
culmination of those debates in the adoption of the supremacy clause
and a notion (albeit sketchy) of judicial review, the idea of multiplicity
found an institutional mooring in the judiciary. This coupling of multiplicity as an idea with courts as a mode of mediating among multiple levels
of government in turn created a new ideology: federalism.
The central constitutional question of the late eighteenth-century
Anglo-American world was whether more than one source of governmental authority could legitimately exist within a single state-the imperium in
imperio question. Bailyn identifies the issue as crucial to the debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitution. "The key doctrine of federalism could survive criticism only to the extent that it could somehow be
distinguished from the ancient belief that imperium in imperio was an illogical and unresolvable solecism," Bailyn argues. "So [the federalists] reexamined that old formula, took it apart, and showed not its falsity, but its
172
irrelevance in the American situation."

Although Bailyn's is a plausible functional account of the federalists'
arguments, it does not answer the question of how the ideas that underlay
those arguments were changing, thereby allowing the arguments to be
made. On Bailyn's view, a doctrine called "federalism" emerged from
the Convention debates and immediately entered the fray of political discourse, and it was only the need to defend the doctrine that led its proponents to fill in its theoretical basis after the fact. Thus, according to Bailyn,
federalism came into existence first, followed by its ideological underpinnings, which were largely the product of the instrumental concerns of the
Constitution's advocates, such as the authors of The Federalist.
171. Ibid., 358: Bailyn associates this desire to merge levels of authority with the
Federalist proponents of the Constitution. But it is worth noting that in the debates of the
1790s and 1800s concerning the scope of federal jurisdiction, Federalists (the label by
then standing for the political party) tended to advocate federal courts with broad, and in
some cases exclusive, powers ofjurisdiction-that is, for more, not less, separation between
the procedural levels of government; see LaCroix, "New Wheel in the Federal Machine."
172. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 358
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But this sequence misses the long development of federal ideas prior to
the ratification campaign, from the colonists' assertions of the possibility of
legislative multiplicity, to the Convention delegates' struggles to assemble
an institutional framework that could support multilayered government, to
the Constitution's normative vision of multitiered authority mediated
through a newly potent judiciary. Jack Greene, Mary Sarah Bilder, and
other scholars argue that the British Empire was an essentially federal
entity, with federal-ness a kind of de facto condition, contested at the
time by metropolitan authorities but defined in retrospect by factors such
as institutions and practices. Even if one accepts such experiential factors
as the relevant criteria, however, the shift in institutional focus that took
place in the late 1780s offers a counterpoint to these scholars' overarching
story of imperial-to-federal continuity.
Instead of stacked legislatures generating several varieties of positive
law, the combined efforts of the delegates at Philadelphia produced a judicial mode of organizing federalism that was altogether different from previous approaches to the problem of multiple authorities. The rejection of
the negative and adoption of the supremacy clause gave state judges the
power to interpret the law of the federal polity while, at the same stroke,
bringing those judges under the occasional control of that polity. This judicially driven federalism was an altogether new species of government,
embracing multiplicity and giving it an institutional home in the judicial
branches of both levels of government. 173 The negative's demise heralded
the emergence of not just an idea, but an ideology, of multilayered authority. After more than two decades of controversy and experimentation,
multiplicity was no longer an embarrassment, a pathological or dysfunctional "solecism" that had infected U.S. government. Nor was it an uncomfortable reality at variance from political theory. On the contrary: The
replacement of the mechanical negative with the spare, elliptical phrases
of the supremacy clause signaled that multiplicity had become the defining
concept of the new republic, a new normative vision distinct from past
Anglo-American practice and ideology.

173. By "judicially driven federalism," I mean something different from the "judicially
enforced federalism" that Larry Kramer has discussed. Kramer uses the phrase in the context
of what has been called the "new federalism" of the Rehnquist Court, referring to the problem of restraining Congress and maintaining limits on federal power (Larry D. Kramer,
"But When Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced Federalism 'Born' in the First Place?"
HarvardJournalof Law & PublicPolicy 22 [1998]: 123-38, 127).

